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When the SupremeCourt votedto reviewthe decisionof the Illinois SupremeCourtholdingChicago's "gang loitering"ordinance
invalidon federalconstitutional
grounds,it seemed plausiblethat
CityofChicagov Morales'would be the occasionfora majorstatementfromthe Court on a set of complexissues-issues including
not only the natureof the police officer'sauthorityto maintain
order in public places, but also the relativeroles of politicsand
judicial decisionmakingin delineatingboth the limitson thisauthorityand the latitudeleftto police to employdiscretionin its
with a
exercise.Afterall, communitiestoday are experimenting
broad varietyof new policingstyles.2Some of these experiments
have emphasizedtheimportanceof a neighborhood'spublicspaces
to the healthof its community
and have involvedpolice in efforts
to improvethe "qualityof life"in suchspaces. Police have seen to
the removalof trashand abandonedcars along streetswherechildren play. There has been a revivalof interestin the enforcementof statutesand ordinancesaimedat low-levelpublicdisorder.
In some places,thislocal experimentation
has produceda new conDebra Livingstonis AssociateProfessor,Columbia UniversitySchool of Law.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am gratefulto JohnManning,JohnMcEnany, and Rick Pildes for

manyhelpfulcomments.
'119 S Ct 1849 (1999).
2
For a generaldescriptionof this phenomenon,see Debra Livingston,PoliceDiscretion
and theQualityofLifein PublicPlaces:Courts,Communities,
and theNew Policing,97 Colum
L Rev 551, 562-84 (1997).
? 2000 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.
0-226-36317-1/2000/1999-0008$02.00
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in theability
residents
ofpoliceto confidence
amongcommunity

tributeto the well-beingof the neighborhoodstheyserve.Elsewhere,however,police initiativesdirectedat crimeand disorder

and outright
havegenerated
concern,anxiety,
angeraboutpolice
as directedat minoritypopulations.
intrusiveness,
particularly

scholIn Morales,
a coalition
includedprominent
thatultimately
Solicitor
to
mention
and
the
General
activists,
ars,community
(not

stateattorneys
variouscityattorneys,
general,and law enforcement
groups) attackedthe decision of the Illinois Supreme Court for
being badly out of touch both with the legitimateaspirationof
innercityresidentsto reclaimcontrolover theirneighborhoods
and withthe capacityof theseresidents,freedfromthe ineffective
attemptsof courtsto restrainunreasonablepolice actions,themselvesto imposemeaningful
politicalcontrolsoverthe conductof
police.3Others,meanwhile,fiercelycontendedthat the Chicago
and discriminatory
ordinancewas a frankinvitationto arbitrary
Court to resist
called
the
enforcement;
upon
Supreme
they
police

and "neighborhood
the siren song of "community"
empow-

erment"and to hold the line againsta seriousthreatenederosion
in constitutional
Morales,then,seemed to advocateson
liberties.4

in severalarticlesby Tracey Meares and
was presentedmostpowerfully
SThis argument
Dan Kahan, as well as in an amicusbriefbeforethe SupremeCourt thattheyhelped to
The ComingCrisisofCrimidraft.See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L. Meares,Foreword:
86 Geo L J1153, 1171-80 (1998); Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan,
nal Procedure,
A CritiqueofChicagov. Morales,1998 U Chi
Procedural
The WagesofAntiquated
Thinking:
Legal F 197, 209-14; Chicagov Morales,No 97-1121, BriefAmicusCuriae of the Chicago
NeighborhoodOrganizationsin Supportof Petitioner,at 1-5. The United Statesand apassociastates,as well as variouscommunitygroups,governmental
thirty-one
proximately
tions,and law enforcement
organizations,also submittedbriefsarguingthatthe Chicago
a constitutionally
ordinancerepresented
appropriateresponseto theplagueof gangviolence
besettingsome Chicago neighborhoods.See, e.g., Briefforthe United States as Amicus
at 8-11 ("BrieffortheUnitedStatesSupportingPetitioner");
Curiae SupportingPetitioner,
BriefAmicusCuriae of Ohio, et al, in Supportof thePetitioner,at 1-6; Briefof the Center
forthe CommunityInterestas AmicusCuriae in Supportof Petitioner,at 7-27; Briefof
the U.S. Conferenceof Mayors,et al, as Amici Curiae in Supportof Petitioner,at 2-7;
Briefof Amici Curiae Natl Dist AttorneysAssociationand Intl Associationof Chiefs of
Police in Supportof Petitioner,at 2-5.
to
A Response
Discretion
and Discrimination
Reconsidered:
4 See, e.g., David Cole, Foreword:
87 Geo L J 1059, 1067 (1999). See also AlbertW.
theNew CriminalJusticeScholarship,
to
or Bedrock
Procedures
Alschulerand StephenJ. Schulhofer,
Rights?A Response
Antiquated
also
was
216.
This
F
1998
Chi
U
Meares
and
215,
pressed
Kahan,
argument
Legal
Professors
associain amicusbriefssubmittedby variouscivil rightsorganizations,law enforcement
tions,and lawyers'groups.See, e.g., Briefof AmiciCuriae Natl Black Police Association,
et al, in Supportof Respondents,pp 7-14; BriefAmicusCuriae of the Natl Association
of CriminalDefense Lawyersin Supportof the Respondents,pp 5-9; Briefof Chicago
AllianceforNeighborhoodSafety,et al, as Amici Curiae in Supportof Respondents,pp
12-18 ("Chicago AllianceBriefin Supportof Respondents").
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both sides the properoccasion for a significant
Supreme Court
either
and clarifyreaffirming
pronouncement-a pronouncement
of
constitutional
doctrines
to the host
the
ing
application existing
of loiteringordinances,curfews,and other "order maintenance"
laws recentlyadoptedin manylocal communitiesor, instead,settingthe nation'scourtson a new coursewithregardto the review
of such laws.
Viewed fromthis perspective,Moralesmust be deemed disappointingto everyone.In JusticeStevens'slead opinion,whichwas
joined in fullby onlytwoJusticesand in partby threeothers,six
thatChicago's gang loiteringordinance
Justicesagreed,narrowly,
was impermissibly
vague in its authorizationto police to disperse
members
and
thoseaccompanying
themwheneverthesepeogang
were
in
found
the
ordinanceto mean "reple
"loitering"(defined
in
one
main[ing] any
place withno apparentpurpose") in public
Despite
arguments
by supportersof the ordinancethat
spaces.5
such a holdingwould do littleto realizethe principalambitionthe
Court has articulatedforits vaguenessdoctrine-namely,setting
limitson the opportunity
forarbitrary
and discriminameaningful
torylaw enforcement-theCourt failedto clarifythe rationalefor
thisdoctrineor to explainhow its applicationto theChicago ordinance would promotethe wise use of discretionby Chicago police.6At the same time,the Court's parsimoniousholdingdid not
offeropponentsof the ordinanceanythinglike a robustdefense
of vaguenessdoctrinenor of its applicationto public orderlaws.
It may be too hasty,though,simplyto dismissMoralesas yet
anothercase in whichthe Court has evaded-or at least failedto
come to gripswith-importantissuesconcerningthe relationship
betweenlocal police and theircommunities.
Afterall, the issue in
the backgroundofMorales-namely,theproperrole forpolice patrol in a community-is extraordinarily
complex,implicating,as
it does, not only the law enforcement
role of police, but also the
role of police officers
as peacekeepersand providersof a multitude
of communityservices.Should patrolofficersseek to detercrime
and amelioratedisorderlargelythroughtheirvisible,uniformed
5Morales,119 S Ct at 1861-62.
For a statementby the Court thatthe facialvaguenessdoctrineis animatedprincipally
see Kolenderv Lawson,
by a concernwithlimitingthe potentialforarbitrary
enforcement,
461 US 352, 357-58 (1983).
6
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presencein public places, or should theyadopt a more proactive
posture?If theyshould be more proactive,what should theydo?
Enforcelaws?Mediate conflicts?Serve as ombudsmento address
sera broadvarietyof problemsin the provisionof governmental
vices?And if we are to authorizea significant
categoryof coercive
encountersbetween patrol officersand people found in public
How
places,how do we guardagainstthe abuse of thisauthority?
to
serve
to
as a
do we ensurethatthe grantof authority police
usefulsupportforthe commonuse of public spaces does not beforthe surveillanceand harassment
come, instead,an instrument
of disfavoredindividualsor groups? Even the Warren Court,
the procedures
resolvein articulating
whichspokewithsignificant
of seriouscrime,was remarkto be followedin the investigation
v
in
the
tentative
principalcase in which that
ably
Terry Ohio,7
Court confrontedeverydayaspects of police patrol: "[W]e apof thejudiproachtheissuesin thiscase mindfulof thelimitations
cial functionin controllingthe myriaddaily situationsin which
policemenand citizensconfronteach otheron the street."'
It is increasingly
apparent,moreover,thatanswersto the many
questionsposed todayaboutthe appropriaterole of police in communities-questionsnot onlyabout theproperscope of police pabut also about the best means for assuringpolice
trol authority,
accountability-arelikelyto emanatenot fromnationaljudicial
but fromthe accumulatedwisdomderivingfrom
pronouncements,
And in thisregard,the Moralesopinionsas
local experimentation.
a whole are perhapsgreaterthan the sum of theirparts.These
way
opinions,read together,do not foreclose,but in an important
withlaws regforfurther
experimentation
expandthe opportunity
ulatingpublicdisorder-even as the Courtretainsforitselfa good
ifnecessary,
deal ofroomto stepin and limitthisexperimentation,
from
different
is
Morales
In
this
at some futurepoint.
sense,
quite
the
facial
of
mostdramatic
v CityofJacksonville9-that
Papachristou
the law applicableto pubremade
that
cases
collectively
vagueness
lic orderin the 1960s and 1970s-even thoughin both cases the
7392 US 1 (1968).

8Id at 12.
9405 US 156 (1972).
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a publicorderlaw.'o The unanimous
Courtinvalidated
Courtin

eveneagerly,
Jacksonpronounced
Papachristou
self-confidently,
lawthatthreatened
Florida's
ordinance
an archaic
ville,
vagrancy
valuesand centraltenetsof the
bothfundamental
rule-of-law
In contrast,
theCourtinMorales
American
constitutional
system."

fornarrow
EventheJustices
inthemaanxiously
grounds.
groped
felt
to
with
the
constrained
efforts
of
empathize
jority
Chicago
to dealwiththeseriousgangproblems
communities
afflicting
to"characterize
thenarrow
... clearly
them,
scope"oftheCourt's
and
most
to
alternative
meansby
importantly,suggest
holding,
whichChicagomightconstitutionally
the
of
regulate loitering
gangmembers.12
a specialneedforjudicial
in
Still,evenacknowledging
humility
thisfluidarea,theMorales
Courtcouldatleasthavebegunto definea framework
within
whichfuture
withnew
experimentation
forms
ofpolicepatrol
beassessed.
TheCourtmadeprecious
might
little
on
this
more
modest
front.
there
is a strong
Indeed,
progress
casetobe madethatthemajority
inMorales
didmoreharmthan
constraints
on police.
goodto theprojectofplacingreasonable
The Courtinvalidated
ordinance
ontheground
thatthe
Chicago's
ordinance
too
much
discretion
to
thus
an
granted
police, creating
undueriskthatitwouldbe arbitrarily
the
Court's
deemployed;"3
10For a descriptionof the applicationof facialvaguenessdoctrineto a broad varietyof
"streetorder" laws in the 1960s and 1970s,see Livingston,97 Colum L Rev at 595-601
(cited in note 2).
" Papachristou,
405 US at 161-62, 168-71. The textof theJacksonvilleordinanceprovided in relevantpartas follows:
Rogues and vagabonds,or dissolutepersonswho go aboutbegging,commongamblers,personswho use jugglingor unlawfulgames or plays,commondrunkards,
commonnightwalkers,thieves,pilferers
or pickpockets,
tradersin stolenproperty,
lewd,wantonand lasciviouspersons,keepersof gamblingplaces,commonrailers
and brawlers,personswanderingor strollingaroundfromplace to place without
anylawfulpurposeor object,habitualloafers,disorderly
persons,personsneglecthouses
ing all lawfulbusinessand habituallyspendingtheirtimeby frequenting
of ill fame,gaminghouses,or placeswherealcoholicbeveragesare sold or served,
personsable to work but habituallylivingupon the earningsof theirwives or
minorchildrenshall be deemed vagrantsand, upon convictionin the Municipal
Court shall be punishedas providedforClass D offenses.
405 US at 158 n 1 (quotingordinance).
12
See, e.g., Morales,119 S Ct at 1863 (opinion of Stevens,joined by Souterand Ginsburg);id at 1864-65 (O'Connor concurringin partand concurringin thejudgment,joined
by Breyer).
"3See Morales,119 S Ct at 1861-63.
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cision,however,may well point localitiesin the directionof expandingthe scope of police discretionin subsequentlegislation.
Similarly,the facialvaguenessdoctrinethatwas the basis forthe
decisionaddressesthe concernthatimpreciselaws delegatebasic
on patrol,thuspromotingad hoc
policymattersto police officers
But Moralesdoes not encourand capriciouspolice enforcement.14"
and
their
to acknowledge
localities
police departments
frankly
age
of
it
and
to
means
discretion
develop
using in an accountpolice
able way forthe positivegood of communities.Instead,the deciand to suppress
sionis morelikelyto drivediscretionunderground
the open discussionof considerationsregardingits appropriate
exercise.
The resultin Moraleswas arrivedat throughthehighlytechnical
The
parsingofninewordsin Chicago's gangloiteringordinance."5
is
unconthis
exercise
not
from
only
majorityopinion resulting
detachedfromserivincingon itsown terms;it is also disturbingly
ous considerationof both the natureof police patrol discretion
of the Court's attemptsto influenceits character.
and the efficacy
Because no law can be entirelypreciseand because thereis "no
to be used in thereview
ofimpermissible
indeterminacy"
yardstick
of challengedlegislation,16
vaguenessdoctrineas employedby the
Morales majorityconferson courts considerablediscretionto
of localitiesto regulatepublicconductin
second-guessthe efforts
to enhancethecommonuse ofpublicspaces.At thesame
an effort
time,however,the majority'smethodology-itsnarrowfocuson
the language of Chicago's gang loiteringordinance-deprives
judges employingthe doctrineof any real abilityto promotethe
positiveuse of police discretionfor a community'sgood. Thus,
theMoralesmajoritymayfosteran illusionof judicialcompetence
in thisarena. But the realitiesof street-level
policingremainunforthe worse.
influenced
been
have
and
even
may
changed
and a modsituation
Court's
This articleoffersan analysisofthe
est proposal for reform.I argue that the Court will make little
408 US 104, 108-09 (1972).
v CityofRockford,
14See Grayned

15The majorityin Moralesconcludedafterparsingits languagethatthe Chicago ordinance'sloiteringdefinition
(whichdefinedloiteringto mean "remain[ing]in anyone place
withno apparentpurpose")was impermissibly
vague. See Morales,119 S Ct at 1861-62.
16
71 Va
and theConstruction
JohnCalvinJeffries,
Jr.,Legality,Vagueness,
ofPenalStatutes,
L Rev 189, 196 (1985).
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police enforceprogresson the projectof constrainingarbitrary
ment of newlyenacted public order laws until it importssome
realisminto its doctrinalframework.
Realismabout police patrol
discretion,moreover,pointsin the directionof a vaguenesstest
thatis not focusedexclusively
on thewordsof thisnew generation
of public order laws. Rather,the Court should considermore
broadlywhetherthe exerciseof police discretioncontemplatedin
new legislationwill take place underconditionsthatprovidereasonable assurancesof police accountability.
Part I brieflydescribesboth the contextin which the Morales
ordinancewas enactedand the Moralesopinionsthemselves.Part
II thendelvesintothe confusionin the Court'svaguenessanalysis.
This part arguesthatthe MoralesCourt's approachto vagueness
does not meaningfully
constrainthe opportunity
forarbitrary
police actionbecause it has no applicationto manycontextsin which
thisopportunity
is present-in the enforcement
of traffic
laws,for
instance,or in the area of stop and frisk.Moreover,the Morales
majority'snarrowfocuson the languageof Chicago's gang loitering ordinance may encourage legislatorssearchingfor precise
termsto broaden the enforcement
authorizationgiven to police
and thusto augment,ratherthannarrow,the scope of police discretion.The majoritythusfocusedon factorsof littleimportance
to the restraintof police arbitrariness.
It also ignoredaspectsof
the Chicago law thatmightactuallyhave promotedthe judicious
use of discretionby Chicago police. Indeed, the majority'sdisreinnovationsin the Chicago ordinanceis likely
gard of significant
to retardefforts
at promotingpolice accountability.
Part III concludeswitha sketchof a morerealisticvaguenessjurisprudence
in
the area of public orderpolicing.

I. THECASEANDITSCONTEXT
A. THE CHICAGO ORDINANCE

Chicago's gang loiteringordinancewas enactedin 1992, during
a period when the numberof Chicago homicidesdeemed to be
gang relatedby the Chicago Police Departmentwas in the midst
of a fivefoldincrease-from approximately
such homififty-one
cides in 1987 to around 132 in 1991, and thento a high of about
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26.2 percentof all Chicago
240 in 1994 (a numberrepresenting
homicidesforthatyear).17Streetgang homicidetendsto increase
and decreasein spurts,but thehuge spurtin the early1990s broke
increasedthe risk
all previousrecordsin Chicago and dramatically
of beingkilledin a streetgang-relatedhomicidefor,in particular,
males and Latinos aged fifteento nineteen
African-American
Of
years."18 course,because Chicago gangs tend to concentratein
particulargeographicalareas,neitherthisrisknor anyof the other
across Chicago's
risksassociatedwithgang activityfelluniformly
of
one
Indeed,
prominentstudy Chicago gangs
neighborhoods.
foundthatforthe three-year
period from1987 to 1990, the rate
in the two most dangerousparts
crime
of street-gangmotivated
times that of the two safestareas.19
of Chicago was seventy-six
in
even
Moreover,
high-crimeneighborhoods(some of which
echoed with gunfirealmost nightlyduring this period), gangrelatedcrime"[was] not monolithic,but ratherdiverse,affecting
different
ways."20 In those neighborneighborhoodsin different
hoods wherecompetitionamongrivalstreetgangsforconstricted
turfwas intense,forexample,buildingsof all sortswereoftencovered withmultiplelayersof graffiti;
neighborhoodsin otherparts
even though
freeof graffiti
of Chicago,however,wereremarkably
inundatedwithgang memberssimplybecause a givengang "was
so muchin commandthat[it]did not need manyphysicalmarkers
mostlethalstreetgangsituto identify
[its]turf."21The potentially
violence-vioationsin Chicago at thistimeinvolvedturf-related
foundto be primarily
lence thatresearchers
"expressive"(meaning
that it was undertakenprincipallyfor purposeslike defenseand
of the gang) ratherthan "instrumental"(motivated
glorification
primarilyby the desire to acquire money or propertyfrom,for
Bulletin:StreetGangsand Crime4 (Ill Crimi7 See CarolynRebecca Block,et al, Research
nal JusticeInformationAuthority,
Sept 1996) ("StreetGangsand Crime").The Chicago
Police Departmentdesignatesan offenseas streetgang relatedwhen a preponderanceof
the evidenceindicates"thatthe offensegrewout of an streetgang function."Id at 2. The
or victimis not alone enough to establishgang relatgang membershipof a perpetrator
edness.Id.
and RichardBlock,StreetGang Crime
18 See id at 5, 8. See also CarolynRebecca Block
in Chicago4 (Natl InstituteofJustice,Dec 1993) ("StreetGang Crimein Chicago").
19See Street
Gang Crimein Chicagoat 1 (cited in note 18).
20Street
Gangsand Crimeat 23 (cited in note 17).
21Street
Gang Crimein Chicagoat 4 (cited in note 18).
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instance,the possessionor sale of drugs).22The Chicago Police
Departmentestimatedin 1992 thatmore than fortymajor street
gangswere activein Chicago.23The mostviolentgangstendedto
be thosesmallergangsthatcontrolledonlya fewfiercely
defended
blocks.24

The effort
to enacta gangloiteringlaw in Chicago can be traced
to 1991, when a numberof Chicago neighborhoodgroupsconcernedabouttherisingviolenceassociatedwithstreetgangsbegan
negotiatingwith city officialsto develop anti-ganglegislation.25
These negotiationsled to hearingsbeforethe Chicago CityCouncil in the springof 1992 duringwhichtestimony
was elicitedconcerninga proposalforenactmentofan ordinanceregulatingloitering by gang membersin public places. Many concernedcitizens
testifiedpoignantlyabout the disruptionthat the latestwave of
gang violencehad workedin theirlives.A motherof four,forinstance, attestedthat in her neighborhood,childrenno longer
playedhopscotchor jacks in the street:"I wishyou could see the
rustthathas accumulatedbecausetheycannotride [their]bikes."26
Susan MaryJacksonspoke forcefully
of the
Eighty-eight-year-old
fearshe experiencedin public spaces: "'We used to have a nice
neighborhood.We don't have it anymore.... I am scaredto go
out in the daytime.... you can't pass because theyare standing.
I am afraidto go to thestore.'"27 CityCouncil members,however,
also heardwarningsthatloiteringordinanceswere bothunconstitutionaland proneto abuse: "[V]ague laws ... based on the conbeen subjectto massiveabuse
ceptof loitering. .. havehistorically
both in this city and other cities."28They
by law enforcement,
heardfroma representative
ofthe police department
who affirmed
22See id at 8. See also Street
Gangsand Crimeat 20 (cited in note 17).
23 See StreetGang Crimein Chicagoat 2, n 6 (cited in note 18).
24 See StreetGangsand Crimeat 20 (cited in note 17).
25 See Alschulerand Schulhofer,1998 U Chi Legal F at 217 (cited in note 4). See also
Editorial,Anti-GangLaw Isn't theAnswer,Chi Tribune 16 (May 20, 1992).
26Transcription
of Proceedingsbeforethe Committeeon Police and Fire ofthe Chicago
City Council 168-69 (May 18, 1992) (statementof Desiree Davidson) ("May 18
Transcript").
27Morales,119 S Ct at 1880
(Thomas dissenting,
joinedby Rehnquistand Scalia) (quoting
Transcriptionof Proceedingsbeforethe Committeeon Police and Fire of the Chicago
City Council 93-95 (May 15, 1992)).
28May 18 Transcript
at 99 (statementof HarveyGrossman,Legal Directorof the American Civil LibertiesUnion of Illinois) (cited in note 26).
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thata loiteringordinancewould be a viabletool foruse in dealing
with gang problems,but who also cautionedthatno ordinance,
standingalone, could substitutefor a more comprehensiveapproachto these problems.29
The proposed ordinance"drew both supportand opposition
fromChicago citizensof all backgrounds."30
The CityCouncil debate on the ordinancereflectedthisdivisionand was describedby
the ChicagoTribuneas "one of the most heated and emotional
councildebatesin recentmemory.""Much of the debatecentered
on theconcernthattheproposedordinancewouldhavea disparate
impacton racialminorities-a concernthatwas mostpassionately
aldermenwho
expressedby severalof the eightAfrican-American
ultimatelyvoted againstthe new law.32These aldermancharged
that the ordinancewas "'draftedto protectthe downtownarea
At
at the expenseof innocentblacks.""33
and thewhitecommunity'
the same time,however,the ordinancereceivedcriticalsupport
fromaldermenrepresentingover a dozen high-crime,predomiand Latino wards."AldermanEd Smith,
nantlyAfrican-American
a heavilyminoritydistrictwith
an AfricanAmericanrepresenting
severecrimeproblems,was particularly
outspokenin his support:
"This doesn'tallow the police to go hog wild. But we're tiredof
seeingthe rightsof gangbangersget protectedwhen ... a mother
can't send her childrenoutside for fearof them gettingshot to
On June18, 1992,the CityCoundeathin a drive-byshooting.""35
cil enactedthe proposedordinanceby a wide marginof thirty-one
Chiof Gerald Cooper,AssistantDeputySuperintendent,
29Id at 175, 185-86 (statement
cago Police Department).
30Chicago AllianceBriefin Supportof Respondentsat 4 (cited in note 4).
31RobertDavis, New PoliceArrestPowerLightCityCouncilFuse,Chi Tribune Al (June
18, 1992).
1998 U Chi Legal F at 220 (cited in note
32 See id. See also Alschulerand Schulhofer,
aldermenvoted againstthe ordinance).
4) (notingthateightAfrican-American
" Fran
Ban Passes:Aldermen
Bitterly
SplitonAnti-GangMeasures,Chi
Spielman,Loitering
Sun-Times 1 (June18, 1992) (quotingremarksof Aid. JohnSteele). See also id (remarks
of Aid. DorothyTillman and Aid. Allan Streeter).
34See Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, Black,Whiteand Gray:A ReplytoAlschuler
1998 U Chi L F 245, 249-50. See also JanCrawfordGreenburg,Top Court
and Schulhofer,
Law, Chi Tribune 1 (June11, 1999) (noting
RulingShowsWay to a Legal Anti-Loitering
that"ordinancehad widespreadsupportin manycommunitiesplagued by gang violence,
puttingsome activistsat odds withthe ACLU-a traditionalally").
"
JohnKass, Old TacticSoughtin CrimeWar,Chi Tribune Al (May 15, 1992). See also
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 247-48 (cited in note 34).
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to eleven.36At the end of the debate, six of the city'seighteen
aldermenvoted in favorof the ordinance;as
African-American
noted previously,eightAfrican-American
aldermenvoted against
the new law.37
The City Council issued findingsbased on the evidencepresented at the Council hearingsthatwere includedin the textof
the ordinanceto explainthereasonsforitsenactment.The council
foundthat Chicago was experiencingan increasingmurderrate,
as well as an increasein violentand drug-relatedcrime,and that
both were largelyattributableto criminalstreetgang activity.38
The membersdeterminedthat in manypartsof Chicago, street
gangshad, in effect,"takenover" entireneighborhoodsby intimidatingresidentsinto retreatingfromparks,sidewalks,and other
public spaces thatthe gangs then occupied as theirturf."One of
the methodsby whichcriminalstreetgangsestablishcontrolover
identifiable
areas,"thecouncilfound,"is byloiteringin thoseareas
and intimidating
othersfromentering... ."39The membersdetermined thatloiteringin such places by gang memberscreated"a
justifiablefearforthe safetyof personsand propertyin the area
because of the violence,drug-dealingand vandalismoftenassociated with such activity.""Aggressiveaction was necessary,the
councildetermined,
"to preservethe City'sstreetsand otherpublic places so thatthepublic[might]use suchplaceswithoutfear.""41
The Chicago ordinanceaccordinglyauthorizedpolice to order
any groupof two or more people foundloiteringin public places
to move along on pain of arrest,so long as at least one of the
groupwas reasonablybelievedto be a memberof a criminalstreet
gang. The law specifically
providedas follows:
Whenevera policeofficer
observesa personwhomhe reabelieves
to
be
a
criminal
streetgangmember
sonably
loitering
in anypublicplacewithone or moreotherpersons,he shall
See Davis, New PoliceArrestPowerLightsCityCouncilFuse, Chi Tribune at Al (cited
36
in note 31).
37Alschulerand Schulhofer,1998 U Chi Legal F at 220 (cited in note 4). Four AfricanAmericanaldermendid not vote. Id & n 33.
v Morales,177 Ill 2d 440, 445, 687 NE2d 53 (1997) (quotingtheordinance's
38 See Chicago
findingsin full).
39Id.
40Id.
41 Id.
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andremovethemselves
from
orderall suchpersonsto disperse
thearea.Anypersonwhodoesnotpromptly
obeysuchan orderis in violationofthissection.42
Draftedin a manneranalogousto thatemployedin the federal
RacketeerInfluencedCorruptOrganizationsAct,43the Chicago
ordinancewas repletewith prolixdefinitionsof each of its key
terms.Thus the ordinancedefineda "criminalstreetgang" to
mean any ongoing organization,associationin fact,or group of
activitiesthe
threeor morepersonshavingas one of its substantial
commissionof certainspecifiedcrimes(likemurder,drugdealing,
and armedviolence),and whose membersindividuallyor collectivelywere engaged in or had engaged in a patternof criminal
gang activity.4"Criminal gang activity"was furtherdefinedto
mean the commission,attemptedcommission,or solicitationof a
lengthylistof offenses"by two or morepersons,or by an individual at the directionof, or in associationwith,any criminalstreet
or assistin any
gang,withthe specificintentto promote,further,
A "pattern"of suchactivity
criminalconductby gangmembers."45
simplydenotedtwo or more acts of criminalgang activity,provided that at least two of these acts musthave been committed
withinfiveyearsof each otherand at leastone such act musthave
date of the ordinance.46
occurredafterthe effective
termin the Chicago ordinance.
a
was
also
defined
"Loitering"
to "remain[ing]in anyone place withno apparentpurIt referred
pose."47Notably,the law was draftedso thatgang membersand
thoseloiteringwiththemdid not violatethe ordinancesimplyby
defyinga police order
loiteringtogether,but only by thereafter
"to disperseand removethemselvesfromthe area.'"48The ordidefense"thatno person
nance further
providedas an affirmative
who was observedloiteringwas in facta memberof a criminal
streetgang."49Violationsof the law were punishableby a fineof
MunicipalCode of Chicago, ? 8-4-015(a).
4318 USC ?? 1961-68.
of Chicago, ? 8-4-015(c)(2) & (3).
44Municipal Code
Id
at
45
? 8-4-015(c)(3).
46
See id at ? 8-4-015(c)(4).
4 Id at ? 8-4-015(c)(a).
48Id at ? 8-4-015(a).
49 Id at ? 8-4-015(b).
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fornot more thansix months,and the
up to $500, imprisonment
to
requirement performup to 120 hours of communityservice.50
Withintwo monthsof the ordinance'senactment,the Chicago
Police DepartmentpromulgatedGeneralOrder92-4, a police regulationwhichset forthspecificguidelinesto governenforcement
of the new law forthe purposeof ensuringthatthe ordinancewas
or discriminatory
not enforcedin an arbitrary
way.s5The order
requiredeach police districtand each area unitofthedepartment's
Gang Crime Section to maintaina fileforthe purposeof identifyingthose groupsand individualsactivein a given districtwho
constituted"criminal street gangs" and "criminal street gang
of a gang
members"as definedin the ordinance.52
Identification
as a criminalstreetgangwas to be based on factorsliketheanalysis
of crimepatterndata,interviews
withgang membersor witnesses,
and informationfromreliable informants.53
The order specified
thatdispersalordersshouldissueonlyon probablecause to believe
thatcriminalstreetgang memberswere loiteringwitheach other
or withotherpeople in a givenarea. Probable cause of a person's
membershipin a criminalstreetgang,the orderstated,mightbe
establishedby evidencesuchas theindividual'sadmissionof membership,his use of signals distinctiveof a specificgang, or the
wearingof emblems,tattoos,or similarmarkingsthat could not
reasonablybe expectedto be displayedbyanyoneexcepta member
of a particulargang.54The orderspecifically
cautionedthatgang
could
not
be
established
on
membership
solely the basis of clothworn
the
individual
but
for sale to the general
available
ing
by
public.55
On its face, Chicago's gang loiteringordinanceapplied citywide. In practice,theChicago Police Departmentlimiteditsapplication in General Order 92-4 to public places designatedby the
departmentas areas in whichthe presenceof gang membershad
resultedin "a demonstrableeffecton the activitiesof law abiding
personsin the surroundingcommunity."56
Examplesof areas apSee id at ? 8-4-015(e).
See Chicago Police Department,General Order No 92-4 at ?? I, II.
52See id at ? III.A.
3 See id at ? IV.
54See id at ? V.
5 See id at ? V.B.
56Id at ? VI.A.1.
50
51
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propriateforsuchdesignation,
accordingto police,included"locaor "lotionsnearschoolsused forcriminalstreetgangrecruiting"
cationsnear businesseswhere criminalstreetgang activity[has]
the patronageof thosebusinesses.""Designaadverselyaffect[ed]
tionswere to be made by districtcommandersbased on consultaleadersof comtionswithrelevantpolice personnel,local officials,
and
other
citizens
able
to
providereliable
munityorganizations,
information.58
In addition,General Order 92-4 specifiedthat only specially
designatedpolice personnel-like membersof the Gang Crime
sectionor the districttacticalunits-could arrestindividualsfor
violatingthe gang loiteringlaw.59These police officerswere remaintained
quired to familiarizethemselveswiththe information
in the
criminal
street
active
the
gangs
departmentconcerning
by
arrests
worked.60Officers
areasin whichtheofficers
pursumaking
ant to the gangloiteringlaw werealso requiredto preparewritten
reportswhich,among other things,fullydescribedthe circumstancesgivingrise to probablecause to arrest.61
The Chicago Police Departmentbegan enforcingthe new
law in August 1992 and stoppedenforcingit in December 1995,
when it was held invalidby an Illinois appellatecourt.62During
thattime,the police issued over 89,000 dispersalordersand arEnforcerestedover 42,000 people forviolatingthe ordinance.63
on the City'shigh-crime
concentrated
mentwas "overwhelmingly
neighborhoods."64
When the ordinancewas firstenacted,Chicago Mayor Richard
offered
Daley (one of the law's ardentsupporters)had sarcastically
that"the Police Departmentmightnot enforcethenew law in the
."65 No City
wards of those aldermenwho voted againstit.
...
57Id.

See id.
59 See id at ? III.C.
58

See id at ? VI.C.1.
See id at ? VI.C.3.c.
62See Morales,119 S Ct at 1855, n 6.
63 See id at 1855. Police made 5,251 arrests
underthe ordinancein 1993, 15,660in 1994,
and 22,056 in 1995. See id, n 7.
64
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 252 (cited in note 34).
65
RobertDavis, SpecialUnitsto PoliceLoiterers:
CityWantstoMake New Anti-GangLaw
Hold Up in Court,Chi Tribune 3 (June19, 1992).
60
61
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Council memberattemptedto takethe mayorup on thisproposal
duringthe threeyearsthatthe law was enforced.In fact,thereis
littleevidencethatsupportforthe ordinanceamongCityCouncil
membersin any way diminishedonce the ordinancehad actually
been employed.In May 1998,theCityCouncil passeda resolution
urgingtheU.S. SupremeCourtto upholdtheordinance.The resolutionpassed by a vote of twenty-five
to eight-and now, incidentally,withthe supportof a majorityof thosevotingaldermen
African-American
wards.66
predominantly
representing
The gangloiteringlaw faredconsiderably
lesswell in thecourts.
At the trial level, three judges of the Circuit Court of Cook
Countyupheldthe ordinance(and one judge held it constitutional
as applied to people whom the police reasonablybelieved to be
gang members),but twelvejudges,in separatecases, declaredthe
ordinanceinvalidon itsface.67
The AppellateCourtofIllinoisconcluded thatthe ordinanceimpermissibly
impairedthe freedomof
of
in
members
violation
of the FirstAmendassembly non-gang
that
it
was
it infringed
that
ment,
unconstitutionally
vague,
upon
FourthAmendmentrights,and thatit improperly
criminalized
statusratherthanconduct.68
The SupremeCourt of Illinoisheld that
the gangloiteringlaw violateddue processbecauseit was "imperrestriction
on personal
missiblyvague on its face and an arbitrary
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmedthe Illinois Suliberties."69
premeCourt'sjudgmenton the groundthatChicago's gangloitering ordinancewas void forvaguenessin thatthe ordinancefailed
to set sufficiently
on theenforcement
discretion
specificlimitations
of Chicago police.
B. THE MORALES OPINIONS

The void-for-vagueness
doctrineis one of several
1. Theholding.
devicesby whichjudges mayavoid makingdifficult
constitutional
Alschulerand Schulhofer,1998 U Chi Legal F at 220, n 35 (cited in note 4). Only
66
thirteenofthe nineteenAfrican-American
aldermenwerepresentat thisvote.The majority
of those present,however,voted in favorof the resolution,and fourof the six not present
had voted in favorof the ordinance'spassage in 1992. Based on the assumptionthateach
of the six missingaldermenwould not have changedhis vote if present,ProfessorsMeares
and Kahan suggestthatby 1998, a majorityof African-American
aldermensupportedthe
ordinance.See Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 250, n 24 (cited in note 34).
Alschulerand Schulhofer,1998 U Chi Legal F at 237 (cited in note 4).
67
v
277 Ill App 3d 101, 106-14, 660 NE2d 34 (1995).
68 Chicago Youkhana,
69Morales,177 Ill 2d at 447.
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beforethem-in the case
decisionswhiledecidingthe controversy
a constitutionally
ofthevaguenessdoctrine,byinvalidating
suspect
law as overlyvaguewhileleavingopen thepossibility
thata clearer
ProfessorSunsteinhas shown
versionofthelaw mightbe upheld.70
that the currentSupreme Court has a special fondnessfor such
devices:that this Court not infrequently
employsdoctrineslike
to
clear
rules
and finalresolutions"
void-for-vagueness "avoid[ ]
for
democratic
reflectionfrom
and to "allow[ ] continuedspace
Congressand the states."7"He termsthisstyleof decisionmaking
"[K]now[ing]thatthereis much
bycourts"judicialminimalism."72
that it does not know" and "intenselyaware of its own limitations," a minimalistcourt seeks "to decide cases on narrow
And this Supreme Court, according to Professor
grounds.""73
"embraces
Sunstein,
minimalism."74
The Supreme Court's holdingin Moralescould be termedan
exercisein judicial minimalism.Indeed, even by minimaliststandards,the majority'sholdingwould have to be characterizedas
penallawsare said to be unconstiunusuallynarrow.Traditionally,
"definethe criminaloffensewith
fail
to
when
they
tutionally
vague
that ordinarypeople can understandwhat
sufficient
definiteness
conductis prohibited"and to establishguidelinesforenforcement
and
concreteso as not to "encouragearbitrary
thatare sufficiently
found
The
Morales
[law] enforcement.""
majority
discriminatory
the second
thatChicago's gangloiteringordinancefailedto satisfy
Six Justicesconcludedthatthe ordiof thesetwo requirements.76
nance's definitionof loitering("to remainin any one place with
no apparentpurpose")was so vague thatit in effectentrustedpoand thuscreateda graveriskof calice withlawmakingauthority
enforcement
pricious
decisions.77
The majority's
vaguenessholdingwas thuslimitedto one aspect
of thevaguenessdoctrine-the role of thatdoctrinein demanding
70See Cass R. Sunstein,One Case at a Time 110 (Harv U Press, 1999).
71Id
72Id

at ix-x.
at ix.

73Id.

Id at xi.
461 US at 357-58.
5Kolender,
76See Morales,119 S Ct at 1861-62.
77See id.
74
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thatenforcement
discretionbe appropriately
constrained-and to
a single phrase in Chicago's lengthyand complexloiteringlaw.
JusticeStevens'sanalysisforthe majority,moreover,was nothing
ifnot succinct.In decidingthatthe ordinance'sloiteringdefinition
was impermissibly
vague,the majorityproceededon the assumption thateveryperson loiteringin a public place manifestssome
purpose-if only the purpose to loiter.Police chargedwith dispersinggang membersand theirassociatesloitering"withno apparentpurpose,"then,were in effecttaskedwithchoosingamong
the purposesmanifested
by theseindividuals-purposeswhichpolice could legitimateby acquiescingin the behavioror condemn
throughordersto disperse.In the Court's words:
an officer
wouldhavediscretion
to treatsome
Presumably
in
a
to
idle
or
conversation
purpose engage
purposes--perhaps
to
a
cool
breeze
on
a
warm
too
frivosimply enjoy
evening-as
ifhe suspected
lousto be apparent
a different
ulterior
motive.
an officer
consciousofthecitycouncil'sreasonsfor
Moreover,
theordinance
enacting
mightwellignoreits textand issuea
even
order,
dispersal
thoughan illicitpurpose[was]actually
apparent.7
The majorityprofessedto be bound by the Illinois Supreme
Court's conclusionthatthe Chicago ordinance'sloiteringdefinition clothedofficerswith"'absolute discretion... to determine
whatactivitiesconstituteloitering.'"79 Even settingaside any deference to this statementas a constructionof local law, however,
the majorityfound"[t]he 'no apparentpurpose' standard"to be
"inherentlysubjective.""'And such a subjectivestandard,in the
leftlawmaking"'to the momentmajority'sview, impermissibly
to-momentjudgmentof the policemanon his beat.'"8
2. Otherissues.The majority'sholding,then,was decidedlylimited.ButJusticeStevensaddressedseveraladditionalissuesin those
portionsof his opinion joined only byJusticesSouter and Ginsburg.First,he elaboratedon thevaguenessdoctrine's"fairnotice"
requirementand its applicationto the Chicago ordinance.In the
view of the plurality,the gang loiteringlaw also violated the
78Id at 1862.
79Id at 1861 (quotingMorales,177 Ill 2d at 457).

80Id at 1862.
461 US at 359).
81Id at 1861 (quotingKolender,
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vaguenessprohibitionby leavingthepublicuncertainas to thenatureof the conductthe law prohibited:
to imaginehowanycitizenofthecityofChicago
It is difficult
in
a
standing publicplacewitha groupofpeoplewouldknow
to
ifhe or shehadan "apparent
purpose."If sheweretalking
anotherperson,wouldshe havean apparent
purpose?If she
herwatchand lookingexpectantly
werefrequently
checking
wouldshehavean apparent
downthestreet,
purpose?82
The pluralityrejectedthe argumentthat police dispersalorders
could serveto informcitizensof thenatureof theprohibitedconductfortwo reasons.First,the pluralityconcludedthatChicago's
citizenswere entitledto advance notice regardingthe loitering
prohibitedby theordinanceso thatthesecitizensmightavoid ever
Second, the Justicesin the plurality
being orderedto disperse.83
agreedthatthe dispersalorderscontemplatedin the new law (requiringgang membersand theirassociates"to disperseand remove themselvesfromthe area") had the effectof compounding
theinadequacyof thenoticeafforded
by the ordinance'sdefinition
In JusticeStevens'swords,"Aftersuch an orderisof loitering.84
sues,how long musttheloiterersremainapart?How farmustthey
move?If each loitererwalksaroundthe blockand theymeetagain
at the same location,are theysubjectto arrestor merelyto being
orderedto disperseagain?"85
The pluralityalso explicitlyaddressedthe issue whetherloiterprotectedactivityand determinedthatthe
ing is a constitutionally
freedomto loiterforinnocentpurposesis an attributeof personal
libertyprotectedby the Due Process Clause: "Indeed, it is apparent thatan individual'sdecisionto remainin a publicplace of his
choiceis as mucha partofhis libertyas the freedomof movement
thatis 'a part of our heritage.'"86 Notably,howinside frontiers
82Id

at 1859 (opinion of Stevens,joined by Souter and Ginsburg).

83See id at 1860.
84See id.
85Id.

86 Id at 1857-58 (quotingKentv Dulles,357 US 116, 126 (1958)). The plurality
rejected
the view thatChicago's gang loiteringordinanceviolatedFirstAmendmentrightsfortwo
reasons.First,the ordinance'sprohibitionon loitering"with no apparentpurpose,"the
withthe FirstAmendmentrightsof those loiteringforthe
pluralitysaid, did not interfere
ideas. Second, the ordinance,by not reachingassociaapparentpurposeof communicating
tions forthe purposeof engagingin core FirstAmendmentactivitiesor intimatehuman
associations,failedto implicateany rightprotectedby the rightof association.See id at
1857.
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ever,JusticeStevensdid not analyzewhetherthe impactof Chicago's gang loiteringordinanceon this libertyinterestwould itself
supporta facialchallengeto the ordinance:"There is no need ...
to decide whetherthe impactof the Chicago ordinanceon constitutionally
protectedlibertyalone would sufficeto supporta
facial challengeunder the overbreadthdoctrine.For it is clear
that the vagueness of this enactmentmakes a facial challenge
appropriate."'87

JusticesO'Connor, Breyer,and Kennedy-the otherthreeJusticesin themajority-did notjoin in thoseportionsof the Stevens
opinion dealingwiththe notice issue,88nor did theyaddressthe
issue whetherloiteringforinnocentpurposesis an activityprotectedby the Due Process Clause. Each wroteseparately.In the
most significant
of theseopinionsconcurringin partand concurin
the
ring
judgment,JusticeO'Connor, joined byJusticeBreyer,
went to some lengthsto explainthat despitethe invalidationof
Chicago's gang loiteringlaw, "thereremainopen to Chicago reasonable alternatives
to combatthe veryreal threatposed by gang
intimidation
and violence."89She underscoredthe majority'sconclusion that an ordinancelimitedto loiteringby gang members
thathad "an apparentlyharmfulpurpose"would no doubt satisfy
the vaguenessprohibition.90So, too, she said, would a loitering
ordinancethatrestrictedits criminalpenaltiesto gang members
or thatdefinedloiteringto mean "'remain[ing]in any one place
with no apparentpurpose other than to establishcontrol over
identifiableareas,to intimidateothersfromenteringthose areas,
or to concealillegalactivities.'
limitson the
"91 Laws incorporating
area and mannerin whichtheymightbe enforced,she suggested,
should also be distinguished
fromChicago's gang loiteringlaw.92
3. The dissents.
Scalia
dissentedin a separateopinion,as
Justice
87Id at 1858 (citationsomitted).
in partand concurring
in thejudgment,
JusticeKennedy
88In a briefopinionconcurring
did note thathe sharedmanyof the plurality'sconcernsabout the sufficiency
of the notice
providedby the ordinance.See id at 1865 (Kennedyconcurringin partand concurringin
the judgment).
89Id at 1864 (O'Connor concurringin part and concurringin the judgment,joined by
Breyer).
90See id.
91 Id at 1864-65.
92 See id at 1864.
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did JusticeThomas, in an opinion joined by both ChiefJustice
RehnquistandJusticeScalia.JusticeScalia's dissentbeganbyquestioningwhetherfederalcourtsevenhave thepowerto declarelaws
void in all theirapplicationsratherthanas applied.93
Acknowledging thatthe Court has exercisedsuch a power "for some of the
presentcentury,"he nextarguedthatexceptin free-speechcases
doctrine,the Court shouldat leastconsubjectto the overbreadth
in
finethispower to those cases where a law is unconstitutional
all its applications.94
JusticeScalia relied heavilyon UnitedStates
v Salerno,in which the Court purportedto disfavorfacial chalchallengeto
lenges and noted that theyare "the most difficult
establish
thatno set
must
the
since
mountsuccessfully,
challenger
existsunderwhichtheActwould be valid."95Deofcircumstances
of thisissue,however,
Scalia's
impassionedtreatment
spiteJustice
the majorityin Moralesdid not addresstherationaleforentertaining a facialchallengeto Chicago's ordinance,while the plurality
expresslydeclinedto "resolvetheviabilityof [Salerno's]dictum."96
assertedsimplythatwhenvaguenesspermeatesa law
The plurality
like Chicago's gang loiteringordinance-a criminallaw thatthe
and
as containingno mensrea requirement
pluralitycharacterized
protectedrights-a facial attack
infringingon constitutionally
"Since we, likethe IllinoisSupremeCourt,
shouldbe entertained:
conclude thatvaguenesspermeatesthe ordinance,a facial challenge is appropriate.",97
See id at 1867-72 (Scalia dissenting).
at 1869-71.
95 481 US 739, 745 (1987).
96
Morales, 119 S Ct at 1858, n 22 (opinionof Stevens,joined by Souterand Ginsburg).
97Id. In his opinion concurringin partand concurringin the judgment,JusticeBreyer
similarly
suggestedthatfacialinvalidationforvaguenessis properwhenevera law delegates
so muchdiscretionto policethatit can fairlybe said that"everyapplicationoftheordinance
representsan exerciseof unlimiteddiscretion."Id at 1866 (Breyerconcurringin partand
in thejudgment)(emphasisadded). He arguedthatin thissense,facialinvalidaconcurring
a facialchallenge
tionforvaguenessis unlikethosecases in whichthe Courthas entertained
foroverbreadthin the FirstAmendmentcontext.In the lattercases, "a defendantwhose
conductclearlyfallswithinthe law and maybe constitutionally
prohibitedcan nonetheless
havethe law declaredfaciallyinvalidto protecttherightsof others(whoseprotectedspeech
mightotherwisebe chilled)."A law permeatedwithvagueness,in contrast,confersso much
authoritiesthatit is "invalidin all its applications."
uncheckeddiscretionon enforcement
the rightthatdefendantsassertin facialvaguenesscases-namely, "the right
Accordingly,
exerciseof uncheckeddiscretion"-is, in JusticeBreyer'sview,
to be freefromthe officer's
"more clearlytheirown." Id.
93

94Id
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Not surprisingly,both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
stronglydisagreedwith the characterizationof Chicago's gang
loiteringordinanceas vague. JusticeScalia argued that even if
the appropriatecircumstances
fora facialchallengeextendmore
than
would
Salerno
broadly
suggest,Chicago's gang loiteringlaw
would stillpass musterbecause the law is not vague "in most or
even a substantialnumberof applications.""98He took issue with
thenotionthatloiterersare alwaysmanifesting
some apparentpurfor
in
one
and
pose
remaining any
place
argued,instead,thatloiterersoftendisplayno apparentpurposefortheirbehaviorforthe
simple reason that theyhave no actual purpose in so behaving:
"Remainingat restwill be a person'snormalstate,unlesshe has
a purposewhichcauses him to move.""99JusticeScalia concluded
thatin the bulk of cases, Chicago police could easilyperceivethe
difference
betweenthoseremainingin a place foran apparentreason and thoseremainingtherewithoutsucha reason:"The criteria
for issuance of a dispersalorder under the Chicago Ordinance
could hardlybe clearer."'00
JusticeThomas's dissentwas (ifpossieven
more
ble)
emphatic:"[T]he Court'sconclusionthatthe ordinance is impermissibly
vague because it "'necessarilyentrustslawto
the
moment-to-moment
making
judgmentof the policemanon
his beat,'" cannotbe reconciledwithcommonsense, longstanding police practice,or this Court's Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence."'10
the dissenterssimilarly
Addressingthe plurality,
rejectedthe arthat
a
law
arrest
on
the
refusal
to
gument
hinging
obey a clear
and explicitpolice order mightneverthelessprovideinadequate
98Idat 1875(Scaliadissenting).
99Idat 1877,n 11.
Id at 1876.
100
101
Id at 1885(Thomasdissenting,
and Scalia)(quotingmajority's
joinedbyRehnquist
citation
to Kolender,
461 US at 359).Bothdissents
chastised
themajority
forpursimilarly
to be boundbytheIllinoisSupreme
Court'sstatement
thatthe"apparent
porting
purpose"
standard
absolutediscretion
to policeofficers"
to decidewhatconstitutes
loiter"provides
id at 1887,n 11 (Thomasdissenting,
ing.See id at 1876(Scaliadissenting);
joinedby
andScalia).In thewordsofJustice
Court'sstatement
Scalia,theIllinoisSupreme
Rehnquist
wasnothing
morethana characterization
oftheordinance's
inlightofthatcourt's
language
refusal
to readanylimitations
intoit:"It [was]nota construction
ofthelanguage
(towhich
we arebound)buta legalconclusion
arenotbound)."Id at
(to whichwe mostassuredly
1876(Scaliadissenting).
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notice to the citizenas to the natureof the prohibitedconduct:
in JusticeThomas's words,"[t]hereis nothing'vague' about an
order to disperse."102JusticeScalia chided the pluralityfor perceivingvaguenessproblemsin police orders"to disperseand remove . . . fromthe area." He noted thatthisanalysis,if adopted
by the Court, "would render unconstitutionalfor vagueness
includingPresidentEisenmany... Presidentialproclamations,"
the court-ordered
all
hower'scommandthat personsobstructing
enrollmentof black studentsin the Little Rock, Arkansaspublic
and . . . disperseforthschools "'cease and desist therefrom,
also
cited
a
The
dissenters
with."'"03
lengthyhistoryin which
loiteringhas been criminalizedto argue that loiteringis not a
fundamentalright"'deeply rooted in this Nation's historyand
tradition,'
" and thus properlycharacterizedas a libertyinterest
protectedby the FourteenthAmendment'sDue ProcessClause.104
Despite the plurality'sinsistenceon a "FundamentalFreedom to
Loiter,"JusticeScalia noted, "thereis not the slightestevidence
forthe existenceof [such]a genuineconstitutional
right..." 105
at
some
also
detailed
Thomas's
dissent
Justice
lengththe human
costs exacted in many cities by the presenceof criminalstreet
gangs."Gangs fillthe dailylivesof manyof our poorestand most
vulnerablecitizenswitha terror[towhich]the Courtdoes not give
He notedthatin 1998, "in an
he said.106
sufficient
consideration,"
to curbplummeting
effort
attendance,the Chicago Public Schools
hireddozensofadultsto escortchildrento school"-children "too
terrifiedof gang violence to leave theirhomes alone."'O7Justice
of one Chicago residentbeforethe
Thomas quoted the testimony
City Council to the effectthat "'only about maybe one or two
percentof the people in the city [are] causing these problems
maybe,but it's keeping98 percentof us in our houses and offthe
102
Id at 1886 (Thomas dissenting,
joined by Rehnquistand Scalia). See also id at 187576 (Scalia dissenting).
103Id at 1875 (Scalia dissenting).
104
Id at 1881-83 (Thomas dissenting,
joined by Rehnquistand Scalia) (quotingWashing521 US 702, 721 (1997) (citationomitted)).See also id at 1872-73 (Scalia
tonv Glucksberg,
dissenting).
105Id at 1872 (Scalia dissenting).
106Id at 1880 (Thomas
dissenting,
joined by Rehnquistand Scalia).
107Id.
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streetsand afraidto shop.'"'" In a ringingconclusionto his dison
sent,JusticeThomas noted that"the Court focusesextensively
the 'rights'of gang membersand theircompanions.It can safely
do so-the people who will have to live withthe consequencesof
today'sopiniondo not live in our neighborhoods.""09He charged
thatthe Court,by focusingexclusively
on the 2 percent,had "denied our mostvulnerablecitizensthe verythingthatJusticeStevens elevatesabove all else-the 'freedomof movement.'"110
II.

SOME CLARITY

ABOUT VAGUENESS

The Moralesopinionsexplicitlyraise numeroussignificant
issuesand implicitly
touchupon even more.It is withthe Court's
vaguenessanalysis,however,thatone mustbegin in assessingthe
failureof the Moralesmajorityto illuminatesignificant
currentissues regardingpolice patrol.The problemsin thisanalysisare not
apparentfroma superficial
readingof the Moralesopinions.Such
a readingdisclosesthatthe Court has reachedno agreementas to
those circumstances
in whichthe facialvaguenessdoctrineshould
apply.This, however,is nothingnew."' Such a readingdemonstrates,as well,thattheJusticesvehemently
disagreeamongthemselvesas to whetherthe "apparentpurpose"languagein Chicago's
gang loiteringordinanceis even vague. This factalone does not
constitutean indictmentof their work. As JusticeFrankfurter
noted manyyearsago, unconstitutional
indefiniteness
"is itselfan
indefinite
With
recent
revival
of
statutesand ordithe
concept.""'2
nances aimed at improvingthe qualityof lifein publicplaces,it is
Id at 1887.
108
109
Id.

11o
Id.
See RichardH. Fallon, Jr.,et al, The FederalCourtsand theFederalSystem212-13
111
(Foundation Press, 4th ed 1996) (notingmixed signals sent by Court as to when facial
invalidationforvaguenessis appropriate).Compare Villageof HoffmanEstatesv Flipside,
HoffmanEstates,Inc.,455 US 489, 494-95 (1982) ("[A]ssumingthe enactmentimplicates
no constitutionally
protectedconduct,"a courtshouldentertaina facialvaguenesschallenge
461
"onlyifthe enactmentis impermissibly
vague in all of its applications"),withKolender,
US at 359, n 8 (permitting
partyto attackstatuteon groundthatit would be impermissibly
vague as applied to someone else and assertingthat "[n]o authoritycited by the dissent"
supportsargumentthatfacialvaguenesschallengesare permittedonlywhenstatuteis vague
in all its applications).
112
Wintersv New York,333 US 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter
dissenting).
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thattheJusticesmightcome to different
not altogethersurprising
conclusionsabout whetheranyone of thesenewlyenactedlaws is
for
preciseso as to reasonablyconfinethe opportunity
sufficiently
abusiveenforcement
by police.
Looking no furtherthan the four corners of the void-forunderstood,then,
vaguenessdoctrineas it has been traditionally
it is possibleto casttheMoralesopinionsas instancesof reasonable
of overall
disagreementamong the Justiceswithina framework
doctrinal coherence. On closer inspection,however, Morales
evincesa deeperproblem-a real inabilityon the partof the majorityto offereven a faciallyplausibleaccountof the role thatthe
the opportunity
vaguenessdoctrineactuallyplaysin constraining
law enforcement
and discriminatory
forarbitrary
by local police.
To bringthisaspectof Moralesto the surface,I firstexplorethe
degree to whichthe Moralesholdingis in tensionwithotherasin whichpublicorderpolicingocpectsof the legal environment
curs-and in waysthatdeprivethe majorityof the abilitycredibly
on
constraint
to maintainthatthisholdingrepresentsa significant
I
that
enforcement.
then
for
abusive
the opportunity
argue
police
the majorityfocusedits attentionon mattersof littlerelevanceto
of police discretionand ignoredaspectsof the Chithe constraint
have promotedthe judicioususe of discretion
law
could
that
cago
on patrol.Overall,thispartcontendsthatthemajority's
byofficers
foritsvaguenessdocinabilityto articulatea workableframework
oftheabilityto enactlegittrinethreatensto deprivecommunities
imatelaws thatmightassistin the ameliorationof pressingsocial
problems-and in whatamountsto an illusoryeffortto constrain
police.
A. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

FOR PUBLIC ORDER POLICING

The judicial invalidationof local public order laws as facially
the legal regimegoverningpublic order that
vague transformed
in
this
in
was
countryinto the 1960s and 1970s-a legal
place
regime characterizedby loitering,disorderlyconduct, and vagrancylaws thatwere so vague in terminologyand so broad in
scope that theyhad the effect,in practice,of "'legally' authoriz[ing]the police to arrestvirtuallyanyone.""' The vagueness
to
A NonpenalApproach
ofBreachofthePeaceStatutes:
113RobertForce, Decriminalization
46 Tulane L Rev 367, 399 (1972). For a more detaileddescriptionof
OrderMaintenance,
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cases fromthis period, thoughformallyconcernedthat laws be
clearbothto informpeople whatconductis prohibited
sufficiently
and to confinethe discretionof enforcement
were in
authorities,
fact animated most stronglyby the latter concern-that laws
shouldprovideadequate guidelinesforenforcement
so as to limit
the opportunity
forthe arbitrary
and discriminatory
applicationof
the
time
v
Lawson
was
decidedin
Kolender
legal prohibitions."114
By
1982, it was explicitlysettledthat the most importantaspect of
the vaguenessdoctrineis its role in requiringthat a legislature
establishminimalguidelinesto governlaw enforcement.11
It was
also settled(albeitimplicitly)
thatthefacialvaguenessdoctrinehas
a special applicationto local public orderlaws directedat various
formsof public nuisance.116
During the period leadingup to Kothe
exercise
of
lender,
police discretionpursuantto such laws was
seen to evade any meaningfulreviewin the criminal
increasingly
courts."' The decisionsfaciallyinvalidatingpublic orderoffenses
as void forvagueness,then,were designedin large part to help
securea simpleprinciple-thatindividualsshouldnot walkpublic
streets,as the Court said, "'only at the whim of . . . police
officer[s].'
""118
Morales,then,is but the latestin a line of SupremeCourt cases
in whichthe Court has employedthe facialvaguenessprohibition
law
supposedlyto constrainthe potentialforharshand arbitrary
enforcement
local
The
in
all
these
casespolice.
by
assumption
an assumptionexpressedquite clearlyin Morales-is that courts
these laws and theirinvalidationin the 1960s and 1970s,see Livingston,97 Colum L Rev
at 595-601 (cited in note 2).
114
405 US at 170 (notingthat
For an explicitexpressionof thisconcern,see Papachristou,
and discriminatory
imprecisetermsofordinance"permit[ ] and encourage[ ] an arbitrary
enforcement
of the law").
461 US at 358 (quotingSmithv Goguen,415 US 566, 575 (1974)).
15Kolender,
116
See Jeffries,
71 Va L Rev at 215-16 (citedin note 16) (notingthatvaguenessdoctrine
is morecommonlyinvokedagainst"street-cleaning"
statutesthanagainstlawscriminalizing
more seriousconduct).
117 The lack ofmeaningful
troublesome
judicialreviewin thisareawas seen as particularly
because of ongoingcivilrightsstrugglesin the South. Indeed, manyof the cases pressing
facialchallengesto publicorderlaws in the 1960s involvedtheuse of such laws to suppress
in Southernstates.For a more detailed
peacefulsit-insand civil rightsdemonstrations
discussionof the historicalcontextin whichthese cases were decided,see Livingston,97
Colum L Rev at 598-601 (cited in note 2).
461 US at 358 (quoting
v CityofBirmingham,
382 US 87, 90
1sKolender,
Shuttles'worth
(1965)).
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contributeto the reasonablerestraintof capricious
significantly
when theyfaciallyinvalidatethose public orenforcement
police
der ordinancesthatafford"too much discretionto the police."119
This assumptionregardingthe street-levelefficacyof the facial
vaguenessdoctrineseemed eminentlyplausiblein the 1960s and
1970s,givenboththepanoplyofbroadand ill-defined
publicorder
laws to be foundin the legal codes of manymunicipalitiesand
therelativelack of empiricalknowledgeabout thenatureof police
discretion.120
Because police todayare (and are understoodto be)
vestedwitha considerabledegreeof discretionthatis beyondthe
scope of traditionalvaguenessdoctrine,however,thisassumption
less plausibleas applied to recentlyenacted laws
is significantly
like the one at stakein Morales.
This point can be most easilyestablishedby focusingon three
of the currentlegal regimethat,together,create
characteristics
thatdo not raise
forpolice arbitrariness
substantialopportunities
traditional
potentialfor
vaguenessconcerns.Firstis the significant
thatexistspursuantto broadbut clearlawsabusiveenforcement
suchas thejuvenilecurfewsthathave becomeincreasingly
popular
of the
over the last ten years.12'The mostaggressiveemployment
for
facialvaguenessdoctrinedoes not constrainthe opportunity
mueven
laws
of
such
misuse
and, indeed,may
encourage
police
nicipalitiesto enactthem.Next,the prevalencein certaindomains
of numerousnarrowand specific,but commonlyviolated,lowforabulevelstatutesand ordinanceslikewisecreatesopportunities
lie
These opportunities,
sive police enforcement.
too,
beyondthe
thus
and
doctrine
challengetheMovagueness
scope of traditional
doctrine
rales majority'sassumptionthat the void-for-vagueness
the
Court's
on
check
a
Finally,
police.
represents meaningful
own FourthAmendmentjurisprudence-itsendorsementof warnebulousconcepts
rantlesspolice actionspremisedon admittedly
like probable cause-vests police with a significantdegree of
street-leveldiscretionthat is hard to reconcilewith the Morales
119
Morales,119 S Ct at 1863 (opinion of Stevens,joined by Souterand Ginsburg).
was only "discov120
For an accountof how discretionin criminaljusticeadministration
it became betterunderstood,see
ered" beginningin the late 1950s and how thereafter
Samuel Walker,TamingtheSystem6-12 (OxfordU Press, 1993).
in Major
and Delinquency
121
See William Ruefleand KennethMike Reynolds,Curfews
AmericanCities,41 Crime & Delinquency 347, 353 (1995) (notingrecentpopularityof
juvenilecurfews).
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majority'scondemnationof the discretioninvolvedin applying
Chicago's gang loiteringordinance.
A briefhypothet1. Broad,clearlawsand thevagueness
prohibition.
ical can demonstratenot only thattraditionalvaguenessdoctrine
creforabusivepolice enforcement
failsto addresstheopportunity
ated by broadbut clearlaws,but thatvaguenessdoctrinemayeven
encourage legislatorsto expand the reach of legal prohibitions.
Consider the findingof the Chicago City Council that in many
Chicago neighborhoodsin 1992, criminalstreetgangsloiteredin
identifiableareas so as to establishcontrolover these areas "and
intimidat[e]othersfromentering"them.122Based on thisfinding,
a councilmemberin 1992 mightwell have proposedan ordinance
authorizingpolice to orderany personreasonablybelievedto be
a gang memberto departfromany neighborhoodin which he
othersfromusingpubmightbe foundloiteringso as to intimidate
was essentially
endorsedinJusticeStelic spaces.This formulation
vens's opinion for the majorityin Morales.123Thus, even as the
Court invalidatedChicago's gang loiteringordinance on the
groundthatthe "no apparentpurpose"languagein thatlaw's loiwas unconstitutionally
teringdefinition
vague,the Court reached
out to opine thatan ordinancelimitedto loiteringby gang members that"had an apparently
harmful... effect"would "no doubt
be sufficient"
to satisfyvaguenessconcerns.124
But could our council memberin 1992 have been reasonably
confidentthatsuch a law would survivefacialvaguenessreview?
In an opinion offeringonly the most summaryanalysis,the Supreme Court in 1971 faciallyinvalidateda law prohibitingthree
or more people fromassemblingon any sidewalkand conducting
themselvesin a mannerannoyingto passersby,notingthata city
maynot enactand enforcean ordinance"whoseviolationmayentirelydepend upon whetheror not a policemanis annoyed."'25
Our hypotheticallegislator,then,would have needed to address
the question whetheran ordinanceauthorizingpolice to move
122

See Morales,177 Ill 2d at 445 (quoting City Council's findings).

123It has also receivedsome supportin theacademicliterature.
See, e.g., PeterW.

Poulos,
and Overbreadth
in
Comment,Chicago'sBan on Gang Loitering:
MakingSenseof Vagueness
Laws, 83 Cal L Rev 379, 340 (1995).
Loitering
124Morales,119 S Ct at 1862.
125
402 US 611, 614 (1971).
Coatesv Cincinnati,
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along loitererswho are actingso as to intimidateothersis anyless
vague than an ordinancedirectedat conductthat annoys.Even
prior to the majority'sdicta in Morales,a court mighthave anBut this answerwas cersweredthis questionin the affirmative.
tainlynot clear-cutin 1992.
So what would our legislatorhave done next?He mighthave
thosereasonablybelievedto be crimisuggesteda law prohibiting
from
members
nal streetgang
loiteringin public places withthe
othersfromenteringthese places.
specificintentof intimidating
He mighthave pointedout thatthe Court has on occasion suggested that a specificintentrequirementamelioratesvagueness
he would probablyhave
concerns.126But on further
consideration,
concluded that even this revisionwas inadequate to ensure the
ofthelegislationhe intendedto propose.The Suconstitutionality
about specificintenthave not preobservations
Court's
preme
ventedseveralstatesupremecourtsfrominvalidating
publicorder
laws reasonablyread to include such an element as void for
vagueness.127
Such invalidations,
moreover,mayin factmake sense-at least
to the extentthat the vaguenessdoctrine'schiefconcernis the
The specificintentelepolice enforcement.
potentialforarbitrary
been said to addressthevaguenessdoctrine's
menthas traditionally
mandate that penal laws provide adequate notice to the public
about the natureof prohibitedconduct-not its concernthatpolice mightmisusean overlyambiguouslaw.128It is easy to understand,moreover,how includinga specificintentelementamong
thosefactswhichmustbe shownat trialworks(at leastin theory)
As the Court has said,to hold someone
to cure noticedifficulties.
liableforviolatinga law containinga specificintentelement,a fact
findermustconcludethatthe defendantat the timeof the alleged
offense"[was] aware thatwhat he [did was] preciselythatwhich
Such a conclusion,of course,substantially
the statuteforbids."129
126
405 US at 163.
See, e.g., Papachristou,
127
See, e.g., E.L. v State,619 S2d 252, 253 (Fla 1993) (invalidating
drug loiteringordiloiterv State,619 S2d 231, 236 (Fla 1993) (invalidating
nanceas vague); Wyche
prostitution
ing ordinanceforvagueness);CityofAkronv Rowland,67 Ohio St 3d 374, 381-86, 618
NE2d 138 (Ohio 1993) (invalidating
drugloiteringordinanceas vague).
128
See Screwsv UnitedStates,325 US 91, 103-04 (1945).
129
Id at 104.
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amelioratesany concernthatbecause of the vaguenessin a legal
the defendanthad no noticeof whatthe law required.
prohibition,
It is less easyto perceive,however,how a specificintentrequirementmeaningfully
constrainsthe potentialforarbitrary
police enforcementon the street.In thiscontext,the vaguenessdoctrine's
demandforadequate specificity
in statutesand ordinancesis deto
ensure
not capriciouslyemployambiguthat
officers
do
signed
ous laws to chargepeople in lightof the officers'own "personal
But our conscientiouslegislatorin 1992 was alpredilections.""130
worried
about
the vaguenessin a law authorizingpolice to
ready
those
members
disperse
gang
loiteringin such a way as to intimidate others,objectivelyspeaking.Could he honestlyconcludethat
more guidance froma law directing
police receive significantly
themto move along thosegangmembersloiteringso as to intimidate others-but now fromeach gangmember'ssubjective
perspective?In reality,an officerwould relyon the verysame observable
conduct to make judgmentsabout the loiterer'sinternalmental
statethathe would have used to determinewhetherthisloiterer
was actingin a mannerreasonablylikelyto have harmfuleffects
on others.
Our legislatorcould not be blamed at thisjuncturefortaking
yetanothertackto minimizeanyvaguenessin his proposedordinance. He mighthave noticed that most streetgang offensesin
Chicago have historicallybeen committedby young people between the ages of fifteenand nineteen.131Why not enact a law
prohibitingat least the juvenilesin this group fromloiteringin
public places? Or betteryet,frombeing in public places, except
forcarefullyspecifiedpurposes?By removingfrompolice the neor purposefully
harmfulloicessityof distinguishing
intimidating
from
harmless
this
does
tering
loitering,
approach
substantially
amelioratevaguenessconcerns.But it does so onlyby broadening
the categoryof people subjectto the law to a group definedby
age-an attributeofferingthe advantagethatit can be specified
(at least comparatively)with a substantialmeasure of rulelike
precision.
This is not what happenedin Chicago in 1992. There is evidence, however,thatsomethingverymuch like thishypothetical
130Goguen,415 US at 575.

"' See StreetGangsand Crimeat 7 (cited in note 17).
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happened in many other municipalitiesin the 1990s. In cities
across the country,manylegislatorsconcernedwithpublic order
issuesproposedand thenenactedlaws verysimilarto the one just
discussed-namely,juvenile curfews.132These legislators,moreover,were not out of the mainstreamin any sense. In the 1990s,
curfewsbecame "the norm in major Americancities.""33As of
1995, theyexistedin 77 percentof thosecitieswith 1992 populationsof 200,000 or more;halfof all such citieseitherenactednew
curfewsor revised existingones between the years 1990 and
1994.134

Curfewshave also been upheld by severalappellatecourts.Indeed,withinone weekof the Court'sdecisionin Moralesinvalidating Chicago's gang loiteringlaw, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Districtof Columbia Circuit,in an en banc decision,upheld
of the Districtof Columbia's juvenile curthe constitutionality
few-a law "whichbars juveniles16 and under frombeing in a
public place unaccompaniedby a parent or withoutequivalent
adult supervisionfrom11:00 p.m. on SundaythroughThursday
to 6:00 a.m. the followingday" and frommidnighton Friday
The law
and Saturdaynightto 6:00 a.m. the followingmorning.135
was enacted "to protectthe welfareof minorsby reducingthe
likelihood that minors will perpetrateor become victims of
132
See Livingston,97 Colum L Rev at 556, n 15 (citedin note 2) (juvenilecurfewsnow
of the nation'slargestcities).
in effectin nearlythree-quarters
133
Ruefleand Reynolds,41 Crime & Delinquencyat 353 (cited in note 121).
134See id.

v DistrictofColumbia,188 F3d 531, 534 (DC Cir 1999). As the D.C. Circuit
135Hutchins
Court noted,by its terms,the curfewis not violatedif the minoris:
(1) accompaniedby the minor'sparentor guardianor any otherperson21 years
or older authorizedby a parentto be a caretakerforthe minor;(2) on an errand
at the directionof the minor'sparent,guardian,or caretaker,withoutany detour
or stop;(3) in a vehicleinvolvedin interstate
travel;(4) engagedin certainemploywithoutany detouror stop; (5)
or going to or fromemployment,
mentactivity,
involvedin an emergency;(6) on the sidewalkthatabutsthe minor'sor the nextdoor neighbor'sresidence,if the neighborhas not complainedto the police; (7)
in attendanceat an officialschool, religious,or otherrecreationalactivitysponsored by the Districtof Columbia,a civicorganization,or anothersimilarentity
forthe minor,or going to or from,withoutany detour
thattakesresponsibility
or stop,such an activitysupervisedby adults;or (8) exercisingFirstAmendment
rights,includingfreeexerciseof religion,freedomof speech, and the rightof
assembly.
Id at 535.
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theFourthCircuiteasilyrejecteda
crime
..
."136 Similarly,
to
curfew,
juvenile
Virginia's
vagueness
challenge Charlottesville,
in a criminal
code"canbe a rethatthesearchforclarity
noting
whichcannotbe permitted
to "'convert
intoa
cedingmirage"
indrawing
thepractical
difficulties
dilemma
constitutional
[appro.. .',,137
criminal
statutes
priate]
and detractors.138
But
havebothsupporters
curfews
Juvenile
thatvagueness
itis perverse
decisions
whatever
theirmerits,
supfrom
a
concern
with
the
for
potential arbitrary
emanating
posedly
inthedirection
localities
policeenforcement
maywellhavetilted
as opposedto gangloitering,
conofenacting
curfews
disorderly
duct,orothersimilar
publicorderlaws.Curfews
mayormaynot
and
thequality
of
be a better
of
crime
way reducing
improving
lifeinpublicspaces,
butthereis littleto suggest
thatcurfews
are
forarpreferablefromthe standpointof limitingthe opportunity
police enforcement.
bitraryand discriminatory
At least withinthe hours of theiroperation,curfewshave the
practicaleffectof authorizingpolice to approach and detainany
personwho appearsyoung enough to triggertheirprohibitions.
This is an extremely
broad categoryof people-and incidentally,
theverycategoryof people who are alreadyamongthemostlikely
to be approachedbypolice in a publicplace.139Curfews,moreover,
are oftenenactedas "quick-fix"solutionsto concernsabout communityviolence-and withoutanyconsiderationof the police resources needed to enforcethem evenhandedly.'"Such laws may
not be vague,but the mannerin whichtheyare (or are not) em136Id at 541.

v CityofCharlottesville,
159 F3d 843, 853 (4th Cir 1998) (quotingColten
137See Schleifer
v Kentucky,
407 US 104, 110 (1972)). See also Quthv Strauss,11 F3d 488, 492 (5th Cir
1993) (rejectingequal protectionchallengeto a juvenilecurfew).But see Nunez v Cityof
San Diego,114 F3d 935, 940-52 (9th Cir 1997) (holdingthatjuvenilecurfewwas unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad,and thatcurfewviolatedequal protectionand parents'fundamentalrightto rear childrenwithoutundue governmental
interference).
Turn to Curfews
to Clear theStreetsofTeen-Agers,
NY
"13See RobertHanley,Authorities
Times Bi (Nov 8, 1993) (citingcriticsof curfews).See also Todd S. Purdum,ClintonBacks
Plan toDeterYouthful
NY Times A20 (May 31, 1996) (notingPresidentClinton's
Violence,
endorsementof juvenilecurfews).
139See Egon Bittner,
Aspects
ofPoliceWork98 (NortheasternU Press, 1990) (notingthat
"youngpeople in general"are "preferredtargetsof special police concern").
See Hanley,Authorities
Turn to Curfewsto Clear theStreetsof Teen-Agers,
NY Times
140
at BI (cited in note 138).
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ployed can in practicestill subjecta large numberof people to
efforts.
spotty,erratic-and even arbitrary-enforcement
All this escapes traditionalvagueness analysis.In evaluating
whethera given law is impermissibly
vague, courtsdo not routo this law. They neverconsider
tinelyconsiderthe alternatives
thatthe overalleffectof a body of decisionsinvalidatinglaws in
a given subjectarea as overlyvague may be paradoxical:thatin
futureeffortsto avoid vaguenessand imprecisionin defininga
law's core concepts(like any ordinanceaddressedto "gang members" who adopt "turf" and "annoy," "harass," or "intimidate"
others),legislatorssearchingforprecisetermsmayend up broadauthorization
givento police and thusaddeningthe enforcement
discretion.
the
rather
than
to,
narrowing, scope of enforcement
ing
The potentialcorrelationbetweenbreadthand clarityin public
for
orderlegislation,however,createsseriousanalyticdifficulties
the Moralesmajority'sassumptionthattraditionalvaguenessdoctrinecan be meaningfully
employedto limitthepotentialforarbiof
exercises
police patroldiscretion.
trary
2. Vaguenessand the prevalenceof frequentlyviolatedrules.
Vagueness doctrineis concernedwith the potentialfor arbitrary
enforcement
posed by a given law. No one in the least familiar
withcurrentcontroversies
involvingpolice, however,can be unin which police today have been
arena
the
aware of
principal
in enforceand discrimination
chargedwith actual arbitrariness
The
traffic
Justice
Departmentand New
stops.
ment-namely,
in
now
the processof impleare
even
for
Jerseyofficials, instance,
mandates
that
changesin the operation
mentinga consentdecree
of the New JerseyState Police to addresslong-standingcharges
of racial discrimination
againstminoritymotoristsby personnel
that
withinthislaw enforcement
agency-charges,parenthetically,
admitThe
to
be
has
conceded
thegovernorofNew Jersey
true.41
tedlysmallnumberof empiricalstudieson thissubject,moreover,
bodyof anecdotalevidence,
togetherwitha muchmoresubstantial
in traffic
discrimination
of
racial
that
the
indicate
problem
strongly
extendswell beyondNew Jersey.It is clear thatmienforcement
PlanstoForestallSuit onRaceProfiling,
NY Times Al (Apr
"14See JerryGray,NewJersey
30, 1999) (notingnegotiationsbetweenJusticeDepartmentand New Jerseyofficials).See
also Robert Cohen, WhitmanVowsto RootOut Racial Profiling,
Star-Ledger24 (Apr 15,
1999) (reportingon statementby GovernorChristineWhitman).
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noritymotoristsaroundthe country"are pulledoverfarmorefrequentlythanwhites."'142AfricanAmericans,in particular,"almost
describe[ ] ... as an everydayreality... the familiar
universally
roadsidedetentionfor'DrivingWhile Black.'"143
The grievancesof minoritymotoristsstoppedby police representan important
officials
dedicated
challengeforlaw enforcement
to overcomingthe estrangement
thathas not infrequently
characterizedthe relationship
betweenpolice and minority
communities.
For our purposeshere, however,the immediatesignificanceof
these grievanceslies in the lighttheyshed on the limitedability
of the Court materiallyto influencethe opportunity
forarbitrariness in police enforcement
throughthe invalidationof vague laws.
Trafficrules regulatingspeed, lane changing,and the like are
among the mostpreciseregulationsto be foundin stateand local
legal codes. These laws, by traditionalstandards,are simplynot
of suchlaws,however,no one could
vague. Despite the specificity
that
the
for
and discriminatory
deny
opportunity theirarbitrary
enforcement
is huge-whatever one believesabout the frequency
withwhichpolice actuallyengagein the capriciousexerciseof enforcement
Low-leveltraffic
offenses(likemostlawsregauthority.
minor
are
not
misconduct)
ulating
invariablyenforced,evenwhen
the evidenceof theirviolationis clear. Because almosteveryone
violatestraffic
rulessometimes,moreover,the police, "if theyare
patient,can eventuallypull over anyone they are interestedin
laws emquestioning...." 144In effect,clear and precisetraffic
to
their
own
in
powerpolice pursue
predilections targeting
people
forenforcement
in precisely
themannercondemned
bythevagueness
prohibition.
But this point is obscured in traditionalvagueness analysis.
Lower courtsdo not routinelyconsiderthe claimthatin fieldsof
humanendeavorthatare heavilyand minutely
regulatedwithrules
thatare invariablybrokenat least partof the time,the judiciary's
demand forspecificity
does not significantly
reduce the opportufor
law
enforcement.
Nor
has
the SupremeCourt
nity
arbitrary
142
David A. Sklansky,Traffic
and theFutureoftheFourthAmendStops,Minority
Motorists,
ment,1997 SupremeCourt Review 271, 313.
143 Id at 312. See also HenryL. Gates,Jr.,Thirteen
WaysofLookingat a BlackMan, New
Yorker 59 (Oct 23, 1995) (notingthat "[t]here'sa movingviolationthat manyAfricanAmericansknow as D.W.B.: DrivingWhile Black").
144Sklansky,1997 SupremeCourt Reviewat 298-99 (cited in note 142).
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everacceptedtheargumentthatthe Due ProcessClause's demand
in statutesand ordinancesmightalso reforreasonablespecificity
that
enforcement
The Court's
policiesbe adequatelyprecise.145
quire
continuedskepticismwith regard to such an argument,moreover,can probablybe safelyinferredfromits recentunanimous
decision in Whrenv UnitedStates.146There, the Court outright
mightimposeoblirejectedthe claimthattheFourthAmendment
on
adhere
to
reasonablywell-specifiedenforcegations police to
mentpolicies(above and beyondthatAmendment'smandatethat
probablecause existto supportarrest)merelybecauseof the abundance of commonlyviolatedregulationswithina givensphere.
Whrenwas, in fact,a "traffic"case. The incidentgivingrise to
the suppressionmotionin thatcase beganwhenplainclothesvicesquad officersin the Districtof Columbia who were patrollinga
"high drug area" in an unmarkedvehicle observeda dark PathTheir suspicionssomefindertruckstoppedat an intersection.147
whatarousedbythebehaviorofthetruck'syouthful
occupants,the
officersobservedthe Pathfinderturnwithoutsignalingand then
proceed at an "unreasonable"speed. They stopped the truckin violationoflocal police regulationspermitting
plainapparently
clothesofficersin unmarkedcars to enforcetrafficlaws only in
the case of violationsso graveas to pose an immediatethreatto
the safetyof others.148An officertestifiedthathe approachedthe
violations.149
to give the drivera warningabout traffic
Pathfinder

he observed
however,
window,
plastic
up to thedriver's
Drawing
Whren.Both
bagsofcrackcocainein thehandsofthepassenger,

werearrested,
ofthePathfinder,
thedriver
WhrenandBrown,
from
ofseveraltypesofillegaldrugswereretrieved
andquantities

the truck."15
The petitionersin Whrenhad a simple argument.They contendedthatprobablecause thata driverhas violateda civiltraffic
145 This is despitethe urgingof KennethCulp Davis, who argued that "the vagueness
as thevaguenessof a statuteor ordinance,
of the enforcement
policyis at leastas important
of the
enforcement
and discriminatory
forit justas muchpermitsand encouragesarbitrary
137 (West, 1975).
law." KennethCulp Davis, PoliceDiscretion
146517 US 806
(1996).
147Id at 808.
148 See id at 808,815.
149

See id at 809.
id at 808-09.
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regulationshouldnot withoutmorebe adequateto justifya traffic
willalmostinvaristopfortheveryreasonthat". .. a police officer
in
be
able
to
catch
motorist
[some]technicalviolaably
anygiven
traffic
stops,as
tion."'1sTo guard againstraciallydiscriminatory
well as thepretextual
use of traffic
as
a
for
tool
investiregulations
other
law
the
contended
that
courts
violations, petitioners
gating
of
the
reasonableness
a
traffic
for
Fourth
Amendment
stop
judging
conductdeviatedmatepurposesshouldask "whetherthe officer's
from
usual
so
that
a reasonableofficerin
police practices,
rially
the same circumstances
would not have made the stop forthe reasons given...."152 The Court emphatically-andunanimouslyrejectedthisargument:
thatwouldallowus to decide
[W]e are awareofno principle
at whatpointa codeoflawbecomesso expansive
andso comitselfcanno longerbe theordimonlyviolatedthatinfraction
ofenforcement.
Andevenifwe
narymeasureofthelawfulness
couldidentify
suchexorbitant
we
do
not
knowbywhat
codes,
standard
would
(orwhatright)we woulddecide,as petitioners
haveus do,whatparticular
aresufficiently
provisions
important
to meritenforcement.15s3
Consider the ramifications
of thisresult.There is no question
thatpolice employthe maze of traffic
regulationsproactivelyto
or
to
other
law
violations.Indeed, in many
investigate
prevent
citiesplagued by thingslike "gang activity,illegal guns . . . and
have observedthat"saturating
drive-byshootings,"police officials
an area withtraffic
shuts
down
theseillegal operations."154
patrol
The phenomenonof enforcing
commonlyviolated,low-levelregulationsto pursuebroaderlaw enforcement
goals,moreover,is not
limitedto trafficenforcement.
In New York City, for example,
police enforcingprecisebut oftenviolatedlaws regulatingpublic
and the like have admittedthatone purposein
drinking,
littering,
in such areas is to removeweaponsfrom
steppingup enforcement
the street."ss
Police managerstherehave even claimed thatsuch
Id at 810.
152
Id at 814.
153Id at 818-19.
154 Earl M. Sweeney,Traffic
New Usesforan Old Tool,Police Chief45 (July
Enforcement:
1996).
1s5See, e.g., Eric Pooley,One GoodApple,Time 54, 56 (Jan 15, 1996) (notingobservation
of publicdrinkinglaw oftenpermits
by one New York Citypolice officialthatenforcement
officersto locate weapons on the people stopped).
'
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enforcement
servesgenerallyto deterweaponspossessionin public places. In the words of one New York City police adminisof low-leveloffensesis importrator,the vigorousenforcement
tantpreciselybecause it makes people leave theirguns at home,
"know[ing]theymightget stopped."'56
The aggressiveenforcementof low-level offensesto serve
broader law enforcementgoals may be broadlysupportedin a
community.It may,in fact,help to addressmore seriouscrime.
The experiencesof manyminority
motorists,
however,attestthat
in
this
withwisdomexercise
discretion
area
do
not
police
always
to the communitiestheyserve.
or sometimeswithany sensitivity
Even more importantforour purposes,moreover,is the undeniable factthatit is policewho make these importantdiscretionary
judgmentsconcerningthe resourcesto be put into the enforcement of low-leveloffensesand the broader goals to which this
should be directed.The vaguenessprohibitionhas
enforcement
never been interpretedto constrainthe exerciseof such discreforpolice arbitrariness
tion-despite the factthatthe opportunity
as the opportunity
created
in thiscontextis at least as significant
like
ordinances
gang
loitering
Chicago's
by
law."57
and thevagueness
3. The FourthAmendment
principle.
Finally,the
Court has repeatedlyheld that it is consistentwith the Fourth
on thestreet,withoutpriorjudicialauthoforofficers
Amendment
rization,to applyconceptslike "probablecause" and "reasonable
suspicion"even as the Court has acknowledgedthatit is impossiThe
ble to articulate"preciselywhat [theseconcepts]mean.""'158
tolerance shown in Whrento affordingpolice even extremely
On, ChangePaysOffin New York,Wash156See Ruben Castaneda,As D.C. PoliceStruggle
ingtonPost Al (Mar 30, 1996) (quotingNew York City Deputy Police Commissioner).
in a mannerthatdiscrim157This is not to say thatpolice may exercisetheirdiscretion
basis
inates on the basis of factorslike race. As the Court has said, "the constitutional
for objectingto intentionally
applicationof laws is the Equal Protection
discriminatory
." Whren,517 US at 813. It is impossibleto view the Court's selectiveenforceClause . W.
exerciseof police discretion.
mentdoctrine,however,as a robustcontroloverthe arbitrary
ratherthanthepotential
First,thisdoctrineaddressesactualand intentionaldiscrimination,
that a given legal regimemay create. Secenforcement
and discriminatory
for arbitrary
ond, defendantsbear an "extremely
heavyburdenof proof" to overcomethe presumption
of regularitythat attachesto criminallaw enforcement.
Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest163
517 US 456, 465 (1996) (to dispel
(Little,Brown,1965). See also UnitedStatesv Armstrong,
have not violatedequal protection,"a crimiauthorities
thatlaw enforcement
presumption
mustpresent'clearevidenceto thecontrary'
nal defendant
") (quotingUnitedStatesv Chemical Foundation,
Inc.,272 US 1, 14-15 (1926)).
15Ornelasv UnitedStates,517 US 690, 695 (1996).
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broadstreet-level
discretion,
then,is not limitedto theexceptional
FourthAmendmentcase. Indeed, the Court has broadlyendorsed
the notion in its FourthAmendmentjurisprudencethat officers
can fairlyemploy "commonsense,nontechnicalconceptions"to
deal withthe practicalrealitiesof streetpatrol.159This idea exists
in considerabletension,however,withthe Moralesmajority'sassumptionthata substantialdegree of technicalclarityin the lanis necessaryto the effective
guage to be applied by patrolofficers
constraintof police discretion.
A fewexamplescan illustratethispoint.First,thebulkof felony
arrestsin thiscountrytakeplace pursuantto the conclusionof an
officerthatprobablecause existsto believethata crimehas been
committedby the personbeingarrested.Such arrestsgenerallydo
not requirepriorjudicial authorization,
nor is such authorization
in
most
sought
Similarly,officersmay in most
circumstances."06
cases searchautomobilesand containerswithinautomobilesbased
on a street-levelassessmentthat probable cause supportsthe
search.'"'They may enterhomes to pursuefleeingsuspectsor to
seize evidencein the processof beingdestroyed-againwithouta
warrant,and based on theiron-the-scenedeterminations
regarding
the existenceof probable cause.162All these activitieshave been
held to be reasonableforFourthAmendmentpurposesdespitethe
Court's acknowledgment
that probable cause itself-the central
conceptthatpolice mustaccuratelyemployto act withinFourth
Amendmentconstraints-is a "fluid" legal construct"not readily ... reducedto a neat set of legal rules."'63
Terryv Ohio,however,maybe theCourt'ssinglemostimportant
FourthAmendmentcase in termsof itsrole in constituting
a legal
environmentbroadlysupportiveof the street-leveldiscretionof
159Id.

160See UnitedStatesv Watson,
423 US 411, 414-24 (1976) (holdingthatwarrantless
felony
arrestsin public places are consistentwiththe FourthAmendment).
v Acevedo,500 US 565, 580 (1991) (holdingpolice withprobablecause
161See California
to believeevidencewillbe foundin an automobilemaysearchanycontainerin automobile
in whichsaid evidencemightbe located);California
v Carney,471 US 386, 30 (1985) (holding thata motorhome fallswithin"automobileexception"and may be searchedwithout
a warrantupon a findingof probablecause).
162See Wardenv Hayden,387 US 294, 298-99 (1967) (discussing"hot pursuit");Johnson
v UnitedStates,333 US 10, 15 (1948) (discussingthreatof destructionof evidence).
163Illinoisv Gates,462 US 213, 232 (1983).
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officerson patrol.164Police acting under the authorityof the
Court's decisionin Teny and subsequentcases maygenerallydetain people based on reasonablesuspicionto believe that these
or aboutto commita crime.165
Individpeople maybe committing
uals may be friskedwhen thereis reasonablesuspicionto believe
Once again,thesedetentions
theymaybe armedand dangerous.166
and friskstake place withoutpriorjudicial authorization.In the
greatmajorityof cases, moreover,thereis no subsequentjudicial
of his actions.
reviewof the officer's
judgmentabout thepropriety
streetNo one could denythatpatrolofficers
employsignificant
level discretionin thiscontext,nor thatthe properexerciseof this
discretionis of tremendousimportanceboth to communitiesand
streetstops and searches,afterall, were
to police. Indiscriminate
blamedby theKernerCommissionforhelpingto fosterthe "deep
betweenpolice and ghettocommunities"thatcontributed
hostility
to numeroustragicriotsbetween1964 and 1968.'67And evenwhen
properlyemployed,aggressiveuse of stop and friskcan alienate
and estrangecommunitiesin ways that ultimatelydetractfrom,
ratherthancontributeto, the maintenanceof a vibrantcivilorder.
havenot led theCourtto attemptmore
But theseconsiderations
to regulatethe area of stop and frisk.The Court has
stringently
foundboth streetdetentionsand frisksbased on reasonablesuspicion to be consistentwithFourthAmendmentprinciplesdespite
its recognitionthatsuch encountersare not trivial,but are often
and even "humiliating"to the persons
"annoying,""frightening,"
has
The
Court
authority
upheld the stop-and-frisk
involved.168
eventhoughpolice departments
varywidelyin thedegreeto which
theytrainand overseeofficersso as to minimizeits abuse. It has
ofitsrecognitionthatthestandard
done so, moreover,irrespective
to
have
officers
which
judge the proprietyof theiractionsin
by
cannotbe statedin clear and
individual
an
detainingand frisking
language:
readilyunderstandable
164392

US at 1.

16sReasonablesuspicionthata personhas committeda crimein the pastwill also legiti-

469 US
See UnitedStatesv Hensley,
matea Terrydetention,at leastin some circumstances.
221, 227-29 (1985). For a generaldescriptionof Terryand its progeny,see Wayne R.
LaFave and JeroldH. Israel, CriminalProcedure
? 3.8 at 202-14 (West, 2d ed 1992).
12.
US
at
392
See
166
Terry,
on Civil Disorders157-59 (1968).
Commission
167 See Report
oftheNatl Advisory
168Terry,392

US at 25.
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of termsto capturetheelusive
Courtshaveused a variety
is
to authorize
of
what
cause
sufficient
policeto stop
concept
a person.Termslike"articulable
reasons"and"founded
suspiclear
cion" are not self-defining;
theyfallshortof providing
ofthemyriad
factual
situations
thatarise.
guidancedispositive
is thatthetotality
Buttheessenceofall thathas beenwritten
be takeninto
ofthecircumstances--the
wholepicture-must

account.
169

Compare the holdingin Morales.There, the majorityconcluded
in Chicago's gang loiteringordinance
thatthe loiteringdefinition
affordedpolice an intolerableamountof discretion-so muchdiscretionthatthe ordinancein effectentrustedpolice withlawmakThe Chicago law and its implementing
ing authority.17
regulations,however,at least faciallylimitedthe authoritygrantedto
in whichthisauofficersand carefullydefinedthe circumstances
be
thoritymight employed-authorizingonlydesignatedofficers,
forexample,in the firstinstancenot to arrestor eventodetain,but
only to issue "move along" ordersto those gang membersand
theirassociatesremainingin specifiedpublicplaceswithno apparent reason. The Moralesmajoritymade no effortto answerthe
dissenters'chargethatits condemnationof the Chicago ordinance
was simplyinconsistent
withthe Court's FourthAmendmentcase
law and the trustplaced in police thereto detain,to search,and
even to arrestbased upon "spur-of-the-moment
determinations
about amorphouslegal standardssuchas 'probablecause' and 'reasonable suspicion' .."71 The Court's FourthAmendmentjurisundercutsthe persuasivenessof
prudence,however,substantially
the majority'spositionthatthe "no apparentpurpose" language
in Chicago's ordinanceconferred
on police a "vastdiscretion"too
to
be
endured.172
extravagant
B. SHORTCOMINGS

IN THE COURT'S VAGUENESS ANALYSIS

One responseto all thiscould well be, "So what?"Perhapsthe
Court has been too willingto toleratethe expansivestreet-level
169 UnitedStatesv Cortez,449 US 411, 417 (1981). See also
Terry,392 US at 12 (noting
"limitationsof the judicial functionin controllingthe myriaddailysituationsin whichpolicemenand citizensconfronteach otheron the street").
170
Morales,119 S Ct 1861 (characterizing
ordinance).
joined by Rehnquistand Scalia).
'71Id at 1885 (Thomas dissenting,
172 Id at 1861 (majority
opinion).
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discretionconferredon police by broad,clear laws regulatingminor misconduct,by the plethoraof narrow(and commonlyvioin some
lated) regulationsthatcharacterizethe legal environment
and
even
the
of
human
Court's
own
Fourth
spheres
activity,
by
Amendmentcase law. This is no reasonto abandonwhateverlimand capriciouspolice enforceited judicial controlover arbitrary
mentthatthe facialvaguenessdoctrinerepresents.
Indeed,thisdoctrinemayplayan importantrole in disciplining
police discretioneven if thereare contextsin whichit has littleor
no application.The threatof facialinvalidationmayhelp prevent
outrightdelegationsto police to preserveorderin publicplaces in
anywaytheychoose. It mayconditionpolice and the lawyerswho
assistthemto takeadministrative
stepsto monitoror restrainthe
exerciseof discretion-therebyamelioratingthe problemsposed
Fiby laws embodyingsome degreeofvaguenessin theirterms.173'
vaguenessdoctrinecan playat besta limnally,even iftraditional
thisin no way
itedrole in addressingarbitrary
police enforcement,
It
or
dimensions.
of
its
the
doctrine
symbolic expressive
deprives
that
the
Court
and
be
Supreme
important, verysimplyso,
may
vice in laws
retainsthe authorityto denouncethe constitutional
thatsay thata person'suse of publicspaces is subjectto thewhim
of police officerson patrol.174
theseobservations
Nevertheless,
speakgenerallyto theexistence
of the facialvaguenessdoctrineand not to the questionof how
it shouldbe invoked-or whetheritsinvocationin Mofrequently
raleswas appropriate.Despite the claimsof some advocatesopposing Chicago's gang loiteringlaw,the questionsit presentedto the
SupremeCourt were neithereasy nor clear-cut.Granted,it is an
open questionwhetherlaws like the one at stakein Moraleswill
in addressinggangviolenceand theneighborproveto be effective
it
hood disintegration can effect.'75Many citieslike Chicago,howThis point drawsupon and profitsfromPeter Strauss'smore extendeddiscussionof
"73
doctrinesin the contextof administrative
the role of the delegationand void-for-vagueness
on Rubin,
law. See Peter L. Strauss,Legislative
Theoryand theRule ofLaw: SomeComments
89 Colum L Rev 427, 441-45 (1989).
174
382 US at 90 (quotingCox v Louisiana,379 US 536, 579 (1965)).
See Shuttlesworth,
at gangs are often
directedspecifically
efforts
that
law enforcement
175For an argument
because theyhave the unintendedeffectof transforming
looselyassocicounterproductive
criminalorganizaated groupsofyoungpeople intomoresolidlybonded(and threatening)
in JamesQ. Wilson and Joan Petersilia,
tions,see Malcolm W. Klein, StreetGang Cycles,
eds, Crime217, 235 (ICS Press, 1995).
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withnew methodsof addressing
ever,are seriouslyexperimenting
violencein theircommunitieswhile at the same time attempting
to limitthe powerof police. The Moralesmajority's
appropriately
at least some of thisexperiapproachto vaguenessmay frustrate
mentationwhile doing little,in reality,to restrainthe discretion
of patrol officers.Indeed, this approachmay even contributeto
an illusionof judicialcompetence
police abuse-both by fostering
in thisarena thatsaps energyfromotherefforts
at police reform
and by deprivingpolice oflawfulauthority
to deal withcommunity
problemstheyare expectedto handle.
It is important,
then,thatthe Court beginto articulatea frameworkwithinwhichtherealissuesat stakemightbe addressed.This
framework
cannotlimitcourtsassessingthevaguenessofnew public order laws to considerationof the textof such laws alone; it
mustbe based upon a realisticassessmentof the natureof police
oftheCourt'sefforts
to influence
patroldiscretionand theefficacy
its character.Caught up in the abstractparsingof the Chicago
law's text,the Moralesmajorityfailedto grapplerealistically
with
theissueofpolice discretionin manydifferent
ways.Four principal
in theMoralesmajority'sopinion,in particular,
shortcomings
point
in the directionof a new framework
forfacialvaguenessreview.
Firstis theCourt'shypertextualism.
The ma1. Hypertextualism.
jority'sparsingof the Chicago ordinance'sloiteringdefinitionat
best providesa less thanpersuasiverationaleforthe Court'sholdthishypertextual
ing.More problematically,
approachto vagueness
in
result
one
for
may
replacing
strategy addressinggang loitering
withothersthatpresentgreaterrisksof police abuse.The majority
claimedto haveno choicein itsinterpretation
oftheChicago ordithat
it
was
bound
the
Illinois
nance, saying
by
SupremeCourt's
statement
thattheordinance'sloiteringdefinition
"'providesabsolute discretionto police officersto determinewhatactivitiesconstituteloitering.'
""76Fairlyread,however,thissinglesentencein
the Illinois Supreme Court's decisionwas not a constructionof
the Chicago ordinanceto whichthe Court was bound. Rather,it
was a characterization
of what the ordinance'slanguageachieved
in lightof the Illinois court'srefusalto read any limitationsinto
it.1'77As both JusticeScalia and JusticeThomas argued in their
176Morales,119 S Ct at 1861 (quotingMorales,177 Ill 2d at 457).

177 See Wisconsin
v Mitchell,508 US 476, 484 (1993) (notingthatCourt is not bound by
such characterizations).
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are not binding on the Court:
dissents,such characterizations
of the language(to whichwe are
"[This was] not a construction
bound) but a legal conclusion(to whichwe mostassuredlyare not
bound)."''78
The majority'sanalysisin facthingedon its own characterizationof how the "apparentpurpose"languagein the Chicago ordinance (as construedby the Illinoiscourt)would be appliedby officerson patrol. The majorityreached its conclusion that the
Chicago ordinance'sloiteringdefinitionconferreda "vast discretion" on police only by assumingthatvirtuallyall loiterershave
an apparentpurposefor"remain[ing]in any one place"-so that
officersapplyingthe law were requiredin effectto come up with
howofprohibitedloitering.This assumption,
theirown definition
it
that
renders
for
the
reason
is
ever, unpersuasive
Chicago's
simple
prohibitionon remainingin one place withno apparentpurpose
utterlymeaningless.In the SolicitorGeneral'swords,such a law
"would prohibitnothingat all."'79 But once thisassumptionis set
aside, the judgmentwhetherthe Chicago ordinance'slanguageis
moredifficult-andpredefinitebecomesconsiderably
sufficiently
ciselybecausethelaw would seem to have manyclearapplications.
Two womenwithneitherumbrellasnor raincoatswho standin a
doorwayanxiouslyobservinga downpourdo manifestan apparent
purposeforremainingin thatdoorway-namely,the purposeto
stayout of the weather.Justas clearly,"a groupthatis talkingor
smokingwhile remainingin one place would not ordinarilyhave
an apparentpurpose,since it would rarelybe apparentto an observerthatthegroup'spurposeforremainingin thatplace-rather
thanwalkingor movingelsewhere-was to talkor smoke."'80
The conclusionthatthe Chicago law has a substantialnumber
of clear applications,moreover,is at least implicitly
supportedby
the recordin Morales.There is littlein thatrecordto suggestthat
duringthe period the Chicago law was enforced,police had any
betweenthose gang membersand theirastroubledistinguishing
sociateswho remainedin one place withan apparentpurposeand
thoseloiteringwithoutanydiscerniblereasonfordoingso. As the
See also id at 1887 n 11 (Thomas dis'78Morales,119 S Ct at 1876 (Scalia dissenting).
senting,joined by Rehnquistand Scalia).
179Briefforthe United States SupportingPetitionerat 13 (cited in note 3).
80Id at 12.
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petitionerin Moralespointed out, "afterthe manythousandsof
arrestsunder the ordinance,[the]recordreflectsnot a singleinstancein whichanyone... was arrested,or evenorderedto move
on, while engagedin politicalcanvassing,planninga demonstration, . .. or doing anythingelse protectedby the FirstAmendment."'" The respondentscould not even identifya single case
in which clearlyharmlessloitering(admittedlyfallingwithinthe
statutory
language)had been constrained-as, forinstance,might
have occurredif a social worker,minister,or other responsible
adult foundtalkingto gang membersforthe purposeof advising
themto change theirwayshad been orderedto move along.182
The verydifficulty
of the judgmentdemandedin Moralessugthe
in
gests
importance cases like thisof consideringnot onlythe
textof the law under review,but also alternativeways in which
police mightdeal withthe problemto whicha givenpublicorder
law is addressed.Thus, the MoralesCourt shouldhave considered
whetherChicago's gangloiteringlaw mightbe preferableto alternativeslike juvenilecurfewspreciselybecause police discretionin
thegangloiteringlaw is moreclearlyrestrained.
It shouldnot have
overlookedthe possibilitythat Chicago's ordinancemightpose
fewerproblemsof arbitrary
enforcement
than anotheralternative
thatpolice haveused to addresstheproblemspresentedbya gang's
turfoccupation-namely, the employmentof a menu of commonlyviolated (but admittedlyclear) rules specificallyto target
gang membershangingout in public places.
The Court's neglectof these alternativesis troublingbecause
the choice between Chicago's ordinance and these other approaches to gang loiteringhas seriousimplicationsfor the core
ambition the Court has articulatedfor its vagueness jurispruforarbitrary
law enforcedence-namely, limitingtheopportunity
ment.In the absence of a gang loiteringlaw, patrolofficersin a
neighborhoodafflicted
by gangviolencemightturnto jaywalking,
and
public littering, juvenilecurfewordinancesto suppressgang
An enforcement
effort
activity.
employinglaws formally
applicable
to manypeople but directednarrowlyat gang members,however,
could well resultin complaintsabout harassment-complaintsto
whichpolice managementwould likelyrespondby citingthe po181Chicagov Morales,No
182

97-1121, Briefforthe Petitioner,at 22.
See US S Ct OfficialTr, Chicagov Morales,No 97-1121 (Dec 9, 1998), at 20-21.
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lice department's
forenforcingthe law.183
Such exresponsibility
and
are not
between
residents
changes
policemanagers community
but
have
baleful
on
of
effects
the
reasonuncommon, they
project
This is
ably restrainingthe potentialfor arbitraryenforcement.
because such exchangesobscureratherthan illuminatethe issues
use ofpolice authority-andin ways
thediscretionary
surrounding
in
not
as
thecase of Chicago's gangloitering
simply possiblewhen,
the
ordinance,a law is
subjectof intensepublic scrutinyand is
employedmore preciselyto deal with the problemforwhich it
was enacted.
This is not to suggestthat the vaguenessquestionin Morales
was simple,nor thatChicago'sgangloiteringordinancewas clearly
preferableto otheravailableapproachesfordealingwitha gang's
occupationof turf.If the Court's vaguenessjurisprudenceis to
have an effecton the realitiesof street-level
policing,however,it
is importantthatthe Court move beyondits narrowfocuson the
textof the publicorderlawsit reviews.The Courtmustrecognize
thatthe facialinvalidationof publicorderlaws thatare imprecise
law enforcement-by
to some degreecan itselfpromotearbitrary
clearlaws forpurposesother
pushingpolice to employadmittedly
thanthoseforwhichtheywere enacted,and in contextswherethe
The vaguenessdocexerciseof police discretionis concealed.184
concernis to avoidthepotentialforarbitrariness
trine'straditional
that ariseswhen impreciselaws delegate basic policy mattersto
on patrol.s"'Realismdemandsan acknowledgment,
police officers
that
such
however,
delegationcan occur even when laws are very
in
ways thatcan make the politicalcontrolof disprecise-and
than when an admittedlyimpreciselaw is
cretionmore difficult
employed.
The Moralesmajoritynext erred
2. The "movealong"provision.
riskthatChicago's gang loiterthat
the
consider
to
by neglecting
ing law would be misused was mitigatedby the law's limited
reach-to gangloiteringonlywhenaccompaniedby therefusalto
complywitha police orderto move along,and not to gangloitering alone. The majoritytreatedthisaspectof the Chicago law disto the ordinance'spoand as if it was whollyirrelevant
missively,
183See Herman Goldstein,Policinga Free Society105 (Ballinger,1977).

84See id at 72.

408 US at 108-09.
185See Grayned,
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tentialto be used in an arbitrary
and capriciousway: "[T]hat the
ordinancedoes not permitan arrestuntilaftera dispersalorder
has been disobeyed,"the majorityconcluded,"does not provide
anyguidanceto the officerdecidingwhethersuch an ordershould
issue.""'6In reality,however,thisfeatureof the ordinancewas of
substantialimportanceto the questionwhetherChicago's law reasonablyrestrainedpolice.
This is partlybecausethearrestpowerthreatens
individualswith
seriousconsequences-like an arrestrecord-that are simplynot
presentedby an order to "move along." Indeed, by not at least
commentingfavorablyon this aspect of the Chicago ordinance,
theMoralesmajoritymissedan opportunity
to pointmunicipalities
in the directionof less punitiveapproachesto public orderproblems.This is unfortunate
becausesuchapproachesare clearlypreferable in manycontexts:when the primaryinterestin enactinga
new ordinanceis not so much to prohibitan activityentirely,as
to aid police in regulatingit; when behaviors(like loitering)pose
seriousproblemsin communitiesbut do not bear the traditional
hallmarksof blameworthiness
associatedwithcriminalviolations;
and whenit is difficult
forlegislatorsto definein the abstractprewhat
behaviors
The Court recogcisely
theywishto proscribe.'87
nized in VillageofHoffman
Estatesv The Flipsidethatthe need for
clarityin a law depends in part on the severityof the penalties
that flowfromits violation.'88In Morales,however,the majority
overlookedan analogous point-that the potentiallyharmfuleffectsof legislativeimprecisionare amelioratedwhen public order
laws limitthe arrestauthority
to cases involvingdefianceof a police command.
The significance
of the Chicago ordinance's"move along" feature to the reasonablerestraintof police discretion,moreover,is
not limitedto itsrole in softening
theconsequencesthatflowfrom
the law's enforcement.
on defiance
By hingingthe arrestauthority
ofa police commandratherthanon simpleloiteringbygangmem'86Morales,119 S Ct at 1861-62.
the choice betweenmore
187For a generaltheoreticaldiscussionof factorsinfluencing
or less punitivesanctions,see JohnC. Coffee,ParadigmsLost:The
BlurringoftheCriminal
and CivilLaw Models-and WhatCan Be Done AboutIt, 11 Yale L J 1875, 1886 (1992).
Estates,455 US at 498-99 (expressingmore toleranceforvagueness
"88VillageofHoffman
in laws withcivilratherthancriminalpenalties"because the consequencesof
imprecision
are qualitatively
less severe").
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bers and theirassociates,the Chicago ordinancealso severed,to
some degree,the connectionbetweenthe "order maintenance"
and "law enforcement"
activitiesofpolice.This severancelessened
enforcement
of the gang loiteringlaw
the potentialforarbitrary
in a mannerthatshouldalso have been consideredby theMorales
Court.
As is now well understood,police serve an ordermaintenance
role in two imporrole thatis distinctfromtheirlaw enforcement
tantways. First,police invokinga public orderlaw in serviceof
ordermaintenanceends are oftenless interestedin "enforcingthe
law" thanin "maintaininga patternof public order"-in putting
an end to conditionsor behaviorsthatthreatenthepublicpeace.189
As a result,manyordermaintenanceproblemsare handledon the
withoutanyneed forcitationor arrest.Secstreetand informally,
is generallyless adorder
maintenance,properlyperformed,
ond,
This is partly
of
crime.190
out
serious
versarialthan the ferreting
because the maintenanceof public orderis oftennegotiatedand
relations
thus does not place officersin franklyconfrontational
withpeople on thestreet.In addition,ordermaintenancedoes not
feed the competitive,"crimefighting"self-imageof manypatrol
officers.191

The potentialinteractionbetweenthe order maintenanceand
rolesof police,however,complicatesanyanalysis
law enforcement
of the waysin whichpatrolofficerscommonlyemploydiscretion
of ordermaintenancetasks.Police usuallyrein the performance
thepublicorfrombehaviorsthreatening
citizens
desist
that
quest
contheunderlying
deragainstthebackdropofa law criminalizing
ductthatis thesubjectof therequest.Patrolofficers
invokingsuch
laws, then,are oftentemptedto employthem in the same way
thattraffic
employed-not to encourage
regulationsare frequently
from
desist
to
problematicconduct,but to pursuebroader
people
law enforcement
goals. An officermay elect to make a "public
to negotiatean end
order"arrest,forinstance,withoutattempting
to troublesomeconduct.This is because his real motivationis not
ModelsofLaw Enforcement
and Deterrence
AlbertJ. Reiss,Jr.,Consequences
189
ofCompliance
L & ContempProbs,Autumn1984, at 83, 84 n 3. See
fortheExerciseofPoliceDiscretion,
also JamesQ. Wilson, Varieties
ofPoliceBehavior16 (Harv U Press, 1968).
190
333 US at 14 (discussing"competitive"natureof law enforcement).
See Johnson,
'19 See Samuel Walker,The Policein America61-63 (McGraw-Hill,2d ed 1992) (noting
prevalenceof "crimefighting"self-imageamong police in traditionaldepartments).
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order maintenanceat all. Instead,the officerwants to arrestso
thathe can conducta searchincidentto arrestin the hope that
thissearchwill revealevidenceof more seriouscrime.
Because police at least generallyexpecttheircommandsto be
followed,however,limitingpolice authorityin the firstinstance
to the issuanceof a "move along" orderlessensthe temptationon
the part of police to employa low-levelpublic orderlaw simply
to gain the authorityto search.192
This is a significant
advantage.
The ferreting
out of seriouscrimeis an intenselycompetitiveenterprisethatposes a substantialriskof excessivepolice zeal.193Order maintenance,properlyperformed,
is altogetherdifferent.
By
directed
partiallydisentangling
police measuresthatare principally
at promotingand maintainingpublic orderfromthe more adversarial businessof investigating
serious crime,then,the Chicago
ordinance's"move along" featureat leastreducedthe riskof arbitraryand capriciousenforcement.
3. Administrative
measures.
The next area in whichthe Morales
failed
to
with the subject of police
majority
grapplerealistically
discretionconcernsthe Court's treatmentof the Chicago Police
of
Department'seffortsto regulateand to monitorenforcement
the gang loiteringlaw. The Court dismissedthe Chicago Police
controlson theuse
Department'sattemptto imposeadministrative
of Chicago's gang loiteringordinance,notingsimplythatthe provision in General Order 92-4 limitingenforcement
of the ordinance to designatedareasin Chicago "wouldnot providea defense
to a loitererwho mightbe arrestedelsewhere."194This and other
provisionsin General Order 92-4, however,if implementedcareto amelioratepotentialprobfully,had the capacitysubstantially
lemswiththe discretionary
enforcement
of Chicago's gang loiter192
It is impossible
to separate
ordermaintenance
fromlawenforcement
motives
entirely
in policing
as itis presently
constituted.
in publicplacesto
Byapproaching
gangmembers
issue"movealong"orders,forexample,
policemaythereby
gaintheabilityto conduct
frisks
forsafety
thatmayuncover
evidence
to be usedin
legitimate
Terry
purposes-frisks
theprosecution
ofseriouscrime.See, e.g.,Pooley,OneGoodApple,Time at 56 (citedin
note155)(notingobservation
ofNewYorkCitypoliceofficial
thatenforcement
ofpublic
law in New Yorkhas permitted
officers
to locateweaponscarriedby people
drinking
The formulation
ofChicago'sgangloitering
ameliostoppedon thestreet).
law,however,
ratestheproblemposedby theinteraction
of ordermaintenance
and law enforcement
in waysthatshouldhavebeenconsidered
responsibilities
bytheCourt.
193
See Johnson,
333 US at 14.
119 S Ct at 1862.
194
Morales,
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ing law-and regardlesswhetherdisregardof these provisions
constituteda defenseat trial.
Thus, it is importantthatpolice managersin Chicago at least
limitthe group of officersauthorizedto enforceChicago's gang
loiteringordinanceto speciallytrainedpolice knowledgeableabout
the gangsand gang membersoperatingin theirneighborhoods.195
its work
structures
Indeed, to the extentthata police department
officers
to ensure that
develop significantcommunity-specific
knowledgeabout theproblemstheyare addressing,the exerciseof
police discretionis likelyto be both betterinformedand more
judicious.This reducesthepotentialforcapriciousexercisesof police discretionto a significant
degree.
Consider,forexample,thepositionof theroving,citywidetactiAmadouDiallo in his New York
cal teamthatlastyearconfronted
officers
Those
approachedDiallo, a local streetpedCity foyer.
dler, based on theirsuspicionthat he had committeda serious
had littleconnectionto the neighborhood
crime.But the officers
littlecommunity-specific
and
were
knowledgeto
patrolling
they
Diallo was a
that
street-level
in
the
drawupon making
judgment
likelysuspect.196The resultsin that case were tragic:Diallo, an
withno connectionto the crimethe officerswere inimmigrant
ended up "dead froma hail of bullets" and perhaps
vestigating,
... by a band
whenconfronted
simplybecause "he actedfurtively
of plain-clothedarmedmen.""'97
Incidentsinvolvingofficersconfronting
strangeneighborhoods
and people theydo not know rarelyend as tragicallyas in the
Diallo case. Surelyit makes a difference,
however,thatGeneral
Order 92-4 did not contemplatesendingofficersinto unfamiliar neighborhoodsforthe purposeof "roundingup" gang memof the
bers and theirassociates.The order limitedenforcement
who
were
ordinanceto designatedpolice personnel
requiredto
familiarizethemselveswith informationregardingthe criminal
streetgangs activein the neighborhoodsin which these officers
of Chicago's gang loiteringordiworked.198Further,enforcement
195
See Chicago Police Department,General Order No 92-4 at ?? III.C, VI.C.1 (cited
in note 51).
Boston Rev 15, 16 (Apr/May1999).
196See Wesley G. Skogan,Everybody's
Business,
197
Id at 15.
198
See Chicago Police Department,General Order No 92-4 at ?? III.C, VI.C.1 (cited
in note 51).
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nance was limitedto areas designatedin advanceas places where
affectedthe surroundingcommugang loiteringhad significantly
Such
were
to
deriveat least in partfromsome
nity.
designations
measureof community
consultation."99
The overallthrustof these
was
to
then,
provisions,
encouragepolice to analyzea neighborhood's problemsand to determinein advancethe need to employ
the gang loiteringlaw in that neighborhood.Properlyimplemented,theseprovisionsin General Order 92-4 had the capacity
to influencetheexerciseofpolice discretionin profoundand beneficialways.
Other provisionsof Chicago's police regulationswere likewise
relevantto the questionwhetherpolice discretionwas reasonably
restrained.The requirementthatofficersmakingarrestspursuant
to the gang loiteringlaw preparewrittenreportsdescribingthe
circumstances
givingrise to probablecause to arrest,forinstance,
constrainton the opportunity
representeda potentiallysignificant
forarbitrary
enforcement.200
Recordsof thistypefacilitatepublic
review of exercisesof police discretionand also providepolice
about the behaviorof theirofmanagerswithhelpfulinformation
General Order 92-4 also contemplatedthat the departficers.201
ment's recordsregardinggang memberswould be regularlyupdated in ways designed to help ensure that officersexercising
discretionin the enforcement
of the gang loiteringlaw would be
Thus, these records
actingon the basis of accurateinformation.
were to contain"only the names of individualsthe Department
ha[d] concluded that it ha[d] probable cause to believe [were]
membersof criminalstreetgangs."202
The orderprovidedforreg199See id at ? VI.A.1. In oral argument,at least one Justiceseemed to discountthis
administrative
becausethepolice regulationsdid not provideforpublicdesignarequirement
tion of those partsof the citydeterminedto be places wherethe public presenceof gang
membershad resultedin "a demonstrableeffecton the activitiesof law abidingpersonsin
the surroundingcommunity."See US S Ct OfficialTr, Moralesat 22-23 (cited in note
182). Even internaladministrative
however,can help constrainthe potential
requirements,
forarbitrary
police enforcement-andin thiscase withoutimposingthecostson borderline
neighborhoodsthatwould likelyflowfromany formalpublic designationof theirganginfestedstatus.
200See Chicago Police Department,General Order No 92-4 at ? VI.C.3 (cited in note

51).

201For a fullerdiscussionof the role of recordkeepingin enhancingpolice
accountability,
see Debra Livingston,PoliceReform
and theDepartment
An EssayonAccountability,
ofJustice:
2 BuffCrim L Rev 815, 846-52 (1999).
202 Chicago Police Department,General Order No 92-4 at
? VI.A.5 (cited in note 51).
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ular deletionof the namesof individualsapparentlyno longeractivelyinvolvedin gang activity.203
Perhaps Chicago's police regulationswere implementedbadly.
Perhaps as implementedthese regulationswere even inadequate
the discretionof Chicago police. For the
to the taskof restraining
of
the
majority'sanalysisin Morales,however,it was a
purpose
whatsoeverthatChicago's police managmatterof no significance
more
than
ers did much
simplyencouragewidespreadenforcementof the gangloiteringlaw. This approachto vaguenessis simply wrong.As the Court said in Wardv RockAgainstRacism,the
and implementationof a law are
administrative
interpretation
By notfocusingon
"highlyrelevant"to facialvaguenessanalysis.204
to provide
thisaspectof the case, the Courtmissedan opportunity
both legislatorsand police managerswiththe incentiveto experimentwithinnovativeadministrative
approachesto the reasonable
restraintof police.
law.PerhapstheshorttoChicago's
4. Proposed
gangloitering
changes
to
in
Morales
the
majority'sapproach vagueness,however,
comings
ofwhatthemajorityopinare mostevidentnotupon consideration
ofwhattheJusticesin themajorion omits,butupon consideration
and
itychose to say.BothJusticeStevens,writingforthemajority,
with
the
in
her
concurringopinion,empathized
JusticeO'Connor,
the
serious
to
address
communities
of Chicago
efforts
gang probthem.Unusually,theyevensuggestedwaysin which
lemsafflicting
regulatetheloiteringofgangmemChicagomightconstitutionally
bers. But the verychangesto Chicago's gang loiteringordinance
thattheseJusticesproposed attestto the failureof the Court to
withtheissueofpolice discretion.Indeed,they
grapplerealistically
demonstratethatthe majorityhas failedto fash-iona framework
forits vaguenessanalysisthatrepresentsan effective
responseto
enforcement.
and
for
the potential arbitrary capriciouspolice
Consider firstthe majority'sconclusionthata law prohibiting
only loiteringhavingan "apparentlyharmfulpurpose or effect"
would "no doubt" satisfyvaguenessreview.20sIt is impossibleto
chargedwith
conclude,as the majorityblithelydoes, thatofficers
for
an
in
a
"apparentlyharmplace
dispersingloiterersremaining
id at ? VI.A.6.a.
491 US 781, 795-96 (1989).
205
Morales,119 S Ct at 1862.

203See
204
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moreconstrained
in theexercise
fulpurpose"
aresignificantly
of
to
those
loiterers
theirdiscretion
thanofficers
reacting disperse
for"noapparent
whatsoever.
as thedisIndeed,
purpose"
maining
officers
toascertain
senters
anordinance
whether
requiring
urged,
harmful
a groupofloiterers
has"an apparently
would
purpose"
seemto require
theseofficers
to exercise
morediscretion-more
judgmentin the law's application-than a law directingthemto
disperseloiterershangingout for no apparentpurpose at all.206
Similarly,a mandate to officersto identifythose loiterersremainingin anyone place with"apparentlyharmfuleffects"would
seem to requirea substantialamountof judgmentin its application. At least in the absence of some legislativespecificationof
what these effectsmightbe, such a law seems no betterthan the
law enactedin Chicago.
Indeed,theCourtignoressignificant
sociologicalresearchshowing thatpatrol officersinvokingpublic order laws in the service
of order-maintenance
ends do not considerthese laws and then
them
to
in the mannerof a law studenttakingan
the
facts
apply
exam. Rather,police officersblend legal knowledge,"common
sense," and variousbehavioralnormsin using such laws to deal
withproblemstheyare called upon to handle.207
In the words of
one scholar:

I amnotawareofanydescriptions
ofpoliceworkon thestreets
thatsupporttheviewthatpatrolmen
walkaround,respondto
servicedemands,
orintervene
in situations,
withtheprovisions
ofthepenalcodein mind,matching
whattheysee withsome
titleor another,
anddeciding
whether
a particular
infraction
is
seriousenoughto warrant
to further
beingreferred
process.208
If police do not invokethe law in the mannerof a law student
in language distakingan exam,however,the subtle differences
cussed by the majorityin Moralesare unlikelyto make any difference to the behaviorof officerson patrol.Such subtledifferences
are also unlikelyto affectthepotentialforpolice arbitrariness.
The
majority'sapproachto the reformof Chicago's gang loiteringlaw
is thusunpersuasive
whenviewedin lightofthe availableempirical
evidenceabout the behaviorof police.
206See id at 1885(Thomasdissenting,
and Scalia).
joinedbyRehnquist
207See DavidDixon,Law in Policing
278 (Clarendon,
1997).

208Bittner,
Aspects
ofPoliceWorkat 245 (citedin note139).
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This approach,moreover,is also unpersuasivewhen examined
entirelyon its own terms.Consideryet anothermodificationto
Chicago's gang loiteringlaw discussedby the Court.The Morales
thatlimitingthe
majoritysuggested(withoutexplicitlyaffirming)
criminalpenaltiesin Chicago's gang loiteringlaw to gang memin the
bersalone mightwell curethevaguenessproblemidentified
ordinance.209JusticeO'Connor, in her concurrence,was definite
the ordinance'scrimion thispoint:"[L]imitationsthatrestricted
nal penalties to gang members,"she said, "would avoid the
vaguenessproblemsof the ordinanceas construedby the Illinois
SupremeCourt."210
This position,however,undercutsentirelythe statedrationale
for the Court's holding.If the problemwith the Chicago ordinance is reallythe one identified
by themajority(namely,thatthe
for
law
too greatan opportunity
creates
the
vaguenesspermeating
limthat
it makeslittlesense to argue
its arbitrary
enforcement),
in
criminal
the
penalties Chicago's gangloiteringlaw to gang
iting
membersalone "solves" the problem.In JusticeScalia's words:
in one placewithno apparent
purpose"is so
[I]f"remain[ing]
in controlling
discretion
unbridled
the
as
to
give police
vague
it surpasses
theconductofnon-gang-members,
understanding
howit ceasesto be so vaguewhenappliedto gangmembers
cannotbe decreedto be outlaws,
alone.Surelygangmembers
of
thepoliceas therestofus are
whim
merest
to
the
subject
not.211
To a significant
degree,then,it is fairto concludethatthe majorityin Moralesbothfailedto considerfactorstrulyrelevantto a
realisticapproachto police discretionand focusedon factorsof
littleaccount.The resultis a majorityopinionthatdoes not persuade and cannot assist localitiesin developingmeaningfulreThis is not
and capriciouslaw enforcement.
straintson arbitrary
to say that a more realisticjurisprudencecan renderjudgments
liketheone calledforin Moralessimpleand clear-cut.Such a juriswith
prudence,however,could encouragelocalitiesto experiment
209See Morales,119 S Ct at 1862.
20Id at 1865 (O'Connor concurringin partand concurringin the judgment,joined by
Breyer).
211 Id at 1879 (Scalia dissenting).
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approachesto the policingof publicorderthatmightmoremeanforpolice arbitrariness.
ingfullyconstrainthe opportunity

III. A REALISTICVAGUENESSJURISPRUDENCE
So how might a more realisticvagueness jurisprudence
look?At thestart,sucha jurisprudence
wouldbe rootedin a recognitionof both the breadthof police enforcement
discretionand
thenecessityforsuchdiscretionifpolice are adequatelyto perform
theirjobs. Police discretion,especiallyin the enforcement
of lowlevel offenses,
is a necessaryconsequenceof limitedresourcesand
the need to prioritize.Beyond these factors,moreover,it is also
a naturaloutgrowthof othervariables:the recognitionthatnot all
problemsfacedby police are best addressedthroughlaw enforcement,and thatnot all communitiescan or will toleratefull enforcement
oflawsspecifiedbythelegislature.
This mayseemobvious to informedobserverstoday.As JusticeO'Connor statedin
her concurrence,"some degree of police discretionis necessary
to allow the police 'to performtheirpeacekeepingresponsibilities
"212 As recentlyas fortyyears ago, however,"the
satisfactorily.'
prevalentassumptionof both the police and the public was that
the police had no discretion-thattheirjob was to functionin
strictaccordancewiththe law."213And thisnotionthatpolice are
ministerialofficers-an idea thatpolice have sometimesencouraged-still pervadesmuch of the public discourseabout law enin waysdetrimental
forcement
to the reasonablerestraint
of arbitraryand capriciouspolice behavior.
That said, it is equally importantto affirmthatpolice can be
held reasonablyaccountableforthe exerciseof enforcement
discretion.Much of the discussionhere has emphasizedthe degree
to whichthe void-for-vagueness
doctrinecreatesan illusorysense
of formalaccountability
in its commandthatlaws be sufficiently
discretion.Inpreciseso as to reasonablyconstrainenforcement
the
doctrine
has
been
in
cast
the
worst
of
all
deed,
possiblelights:
as an ineffective
constraint
on abusivepolice conductthatmayeven
contribute
tosuchabusebycastingofficers
leftwithoutlawfulauthor212
Id at 1863 (O'Connor concurringin partand concurringin the judgment,joined by
Breyer)(quotingid at 1885 (Thomas dissenting,joined by Rehnquistand Scalia)).
213Goldstein,Policinga Free Society
at 93 (cited in note 183).
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problemsin therole of "dirtyworkityto addressreal community
bend rulesor employinappropriate
laws to deal
ers" who furtively
are
called
to
with
the
situations
upon handle.214
effectively
they
The vaguenessdoctrine,however,is but one small part of the
legal and sociopoliticalcontextin whichpolice operate.Granted,
in which enforcement
thereare police departments
discretion,if
deniedby police managers,is stillexercisedin a sub
not explicitly
howrosa and ad hoc fashion.There are also police departments,
forarbitrary
on theopportunity
constraints
ever,in whicheffective
have alreadyemerged-in which
enforcement
and discriminatory
effort
is made to acknowledgeenforcement
a substantial
discretion,
to seek inputfromcommunitiesabout its exercise,and to learn
withdifferent
methwithinthe department
fromexperimentation
betweenthese
The differences
ods or stylesof law enforcement.
two typesof police department,
moreover,translateinto signifiand capriciousexercise
potentialsforthe arbitrary
cantlydifferent
in the
of enforcement
authority-andregardlessofanydifferences
enforce.
the
laws
that
of
they
clarity
A realisticvaguenessjurisprudence,
then,shouldworkto stimuwithnew and promisto experiment
late local police departments
in the exerciseof police
ing methodsof promotingaccountability
thisis no easy task.The objectivesbehind
discretion.Admittedly,
the rulesand proceduresset by courtsare alwaysat least partially
transformed
by theirinteractionwiththe subculturalrulesof poand the practical
lice, the police organization'sinternalstructure,
Dorf's model of
Michael
of
exigencies policing.215My colleague
a
outlines
way in which
"provisionaladjudication,"however,
courtsmightfocusmore attentionon the likelyconsequencesof
theirdecisionsin orderto findworkablesolutionsto theproblems
This formof adjudicationis premisedon the
theymustaddress.216
sometimesneed to learnfromexperimencourts
that
recognition
tationwithvariedapproachesto such problems.ProfessorDorf's
worksuggestshow courtsmightimportsome measureof realism
to deal effectively
214For a discussionof how police not providedwith"explicitauthority
withthe problemstheyencounter"oftenbecome "dirtyworkers"who furtively
"'[do]what
has to be done' throughtheexerciseoftheirdiscretion,"see George L. Kellingand Catherine M. Coles, FixingBrokenWindows167 (Free Press, 1996).
215See Dixon, Law in
Policingat 267-68 (cited in note 207).
216See Michael C. Dorf,Foreword:
112 Harv L Rev 4,
The LimitsofSocraticDeliberation,
51-79 (1998).
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into theirfacialvaguenessassessmentswithouttherebyassuming
answersto
the impossibleburdenof providingone-shot,definitive
and
the
best
empirical
policyquestionsconcerning
way in which
to restrainpolice.
Simplystated,courts addressingdifficult
vaguenessquestions
shouldconsiderwhetherthe exerciseof police discretioncontemplatedin challengedpublic orderlegislationwill takeplace under
conditionsthatprovidereasonableassurancesthattherelevantpolice departmentwill be accountableforthe way in whichit employs this discretion.Such assuranceswill not derivesolelyfrom
the clarityof the statutory
text,however,but froma morerealistic
assessmentof the waysin which a public orderlaw will be used.
This approachto facialvaguenesswouldbothpermitand stimulate
with different
methodsof promotingpolice acexperimentation
countability.
By toleratingsome measureof disagreementamong
stateand lowerfederalcourtsregardingthereasonablenessof such
methods,the SupremeCourt mightfurther
encouragethisexperimentation.The Court mightalso maximizeits own abilityover
time to make at least some judgmentsabout the relativeefficacy
of these variousmethodsof ensuringthat the exerciseof police
discretionis reasonablyconstrained.
This approachto vaguenessthus differssharplyfromthatendorsed by Kenneth Culp Davis, one of the earlywriterson the
doctrineand itsrole in restraining
void-for-vagueness
police. ProfessorDavis recognizedthe limitedeffectsof the vaguenessdoctrineon the scope of police enforcement
discretionand proposed
thatthe Court should extendthe vaguenessprinciplebeyondthe
face of legislationto address vagueness in police enforcement
policies:
The Court[inPapachristou
v CityofJacksonville]
quiteproperly
thatlackof
respondedto theproblembeforeit in asserting
in theordinance
standards
is unconstitutional.
ButI thinkthe
fundamental
oflawor
[point]maybe broader-thatvagueness
ofenforcement
is
unconstitutional
because
it
or
policy
permits
and discriminatory
enforcement
of the
encouragesarbitrary
law. . . . I do predictthatthe timewill comewhencourts
willgenerally
holdthatunnecessary
or unduevagueness
in an
enforcement
becauseofthereasons
policyis unconstitutional,
the unanimousSupremeCourt statedin the Papachristou
opinion.217
217

at 137-38(citedin note145)(italicsadded).
Davis, PoliceDiscretion
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The Courtneveradoptedthisproposal,forwhatseem in retroreasons.As ProfessorDavis himself
spectto be good and sufficient
the
for
the
Court
of workingout the limitsand
task
admitted,
It wouldhave rewas
truly"enormous."218
applicationsof his idea
quiredcourtsacrossthecountryto determineforthousandsof farflungpolice agencieswhether"unnecessaryor undue vagueness"
in their enforcementpolicies renderedthese policies unconstitutional-a difficult
job for generalistcourtslackingknowledge
aboutbothinternallaw enforcement
practicesand thepublicorder
Davis's
more
Even
faced
fundamentally,
by police.219
problems
workon police discretiondid not grapplefullywiththe difficulties
rulesboth sufficiently
enforcement
of drafting
preciseto establish
he
terms
in
the
contemplatedand still flexible
accountability
achieve
to
tolerablyadequateresultsin termsof the probenough
which
with
lems
police mustdeal.220Nor did Davis fullyexplore
the questionwhetherthemereelaborationof enforcement
policies
constrainpolice in theirroutineencouncould even meaningfully
terswithcitizenson the street.
Davis's insightwas important:thatcourtsconcernedabout repolice enducing the potentialfor arbitraryand discriminatory
forcementneeded to focusmore attentionon the waysin which
police actuallyemploylaws regulatinglow-levelmisconduct.But
his proposaldemandedtoo much and too littleat the verysame
time.The inadequaciesof Davis's proposal,however,containlessonsthatpointin thedirectionofthealternative
approachoutlined
here. This approachdoes not requirecourtsto take on the task
of passingon all enforcement
policies.It does not lock police deacrules thatfrustrate
partmentsinto overlyrigidadministrative
same
the
while
at
of
ends
the
of
substantive
policing
complishment
timefailingin theirobjectiveto constrainpolice.
This is not the place to specifyall the featuresin a givenlaw
or its implementing
plan thata more realisticapproachto vagueness mighttake into account.Like all testspremisedon reasonableness,the one articulatedhere will permitmanyfactorsto be
218Id

at 137-38.

219See id at 138.
220For a provocativetheoreticalaccount of the generalconflictbetweenaccountability
in bureaucraticadministration-aswell as a
and the flexibility
requiredfor effectiveness
thisconflict-see Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, Drug
proposalfortranscending
Vand L Rev (forthcoming
Treatment
2000).
Government,
CourtsandEmergent
Experimentalist
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considered. We can articulatesome principles,however,that
mightguide the overall analysisof the questionwhetherpolice
enforcement
discretionhas been reasonablyconstrained.221
The articulationof these principles,moreover,can serve as preludeto
some finalconsiderationof a morerealisticapproachto vagueness
in the area of public orderpolicing.
A. THREE PRINCIPLES OF A REALISTIC VAGUENESS JURISPRUDENCE

1. Openness.First is the principleof openness.As I have sughas long been
gested,thehealthyevolutionof police organizations
the
failure
of
to acknowlstymiedby
police departments
frankly
the
broad
of
discretion
to
and
edge
scope police
explainthe rationale forits exercisein different
is simplynot
ways.Accountability
and withan air of
possiblewhen discretionis exercisedfurtively
There are fewreasons,moreover,forthe secrecythat
illegitimacy.
has oftensurroundedthe formulation
and implementation
of enforcementpolicies involvingpublic order problems.The goal of
enforcement
in this contextis not the detectionand punishment
of offenders(a goal thatmay requirethatenforcement
rationales
remain unexplained),but compliancewith legislatedbehavioral
norms.Indeed, the public discussionof a public order problem
and the police department's
proposedresponsemayhelp ameliorate the problembeforeenforcement
ever takesplace. And there
is muchto be gainedfromopennessabout enforcement
discretion
in termsof limitingthe opportunity
forits abuse.
Courts evaluatingwhetherthe admittedvaguenessin a given
public order law is tolerable,then,should considerwhetherthe
thislaw is participating
in a propolice department
implementing
cess in which it explainsits reasons for employingthe law in a
givenway and also reportson its resultsin a mannerthatpermits
evaluationof the efficacy
and proprietyof the strategy
it has choIn
the
case
of
sen.222
Chicago's gang loiteringlaw, forinstance,it
is certainlyrelevantthatGeneral Order 92-4, evenwithoutpublic
designationof the specificplaces in whichthe law would be enforced,did specifythe criteriafordesignatinga givenarea in Chi221Thisanalysis
buildsupon,butalsopartly
workon thissubject
from,
departs
myearlier
in Livingston,
97 ColumL Revat 667-70 (citedin note2).
222For a general
discussion
ofthisapproach
to accountability,
see DorfandSabel,Vand
L Rev(citedin note220).
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It is likewiserelevantthat
cago for gang loiteringenforcement.
the law requiredthe preparationof writtenreportseach time an
arrestwas made. Standingalone, these measuresmightnot be
enough to rendera given public order law constitutional.Such
measurespointin the rightdirection,however-towardthe open
discretionand the provisionof
of enforcement
acknowledgment
ensure
that
exercisesof discretioncan be
information
to
adequate
within
a
reviewed
community.
appropriately
courtsexAs a secondprincipleof accountability,
2. Monitoring.
to facial
law
be
vulnerable
that
a
order
might
amining public
law
is bewhether
this
also
consider
invalidation
should
vagueness
monitoring
ing employedin such a wayas to provideforeffective
take
a
can
mechanisms
of its enforcement.
varietyof
Monitoring
forms.Monitoringmightbe performedby a legislativeoversight
committeearmed with the rich informationabout enforcement
could be required
thata reasonablyconstrainedpolice department
in thisrole throughtheirconto provide.Courtsmightparticipate
siderationof "as applied" challengesand theirreviewof the sufficiencyof the evidencein individualcases.
the monitoringfunctionmightalso
Perhapsmost promisingly,
arisefromthepremisesof community
policing.In a police departtheprinciplesof thissubstantive
mentthathas implemented
policing theory,neighborhoodresidentsare involvedin identifying
local public order problems and prioritizingamong them "in
a constructive
dialoguewithone anotherand withpolice officers
who workin theirimmediatearea."223In Chicago, this effortat
occursat monthlypublic meetings
partnership
police-community
held in each of the city's279 smallpolice beats.224In theory,when
police and citizensmeet together"to reporton what theyhave
accomplishedsince the last meeting,and what theywill workon
next,"this formof cooperationcan itselfplay an importantrole
in monitoringpolice order maintenanceactivities.22Certainly
of a challengedpublicorderlaw is built
whenthe implementation
dedicatedto
intosuch an organizationalframework-aframework
for
to
residents
month-out
accountability
"securing month-in,
Boston Rev at
223Skogan,Everybody's
Business,
224See id.
225

Id.

15 (Apr/May1999) (cited in note 196).
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whatbeat officers
are doing"-this is a relevantfactorto consider
in assessingthe likelihoodthat this law will be employedin an
and capriciousway.226
arbitrary
3. Limitedpoliceauthority.
Third and finally,courtsevaluating
whetherthe measureof indeterminacy
in a givenpublicorderlaw
is acceptableshouldconsiderwhetherreasonableefforts
havebeen
made to limitpolice authority.
This is simplyan extensionof traditional vaguenessreview.In employingthe facialvaguenessdoctrine,courtsalreadypurportto limitpolice authorityby forcing
so thatpalegislaturesto defineprohibitedconductmorecarefully
trolofficers
cannotarbitrarily
employoverlyambiguouslaws.The
principleat workhere is preciselythe same-that reasonableconstraintson enforcement
authorityare beneficialbecause theyreduce theopportunity
forpolice abuse. In a morerealisticapproach
to vagueness,however,such constraintsneed not derive solely
fromclarityin an ordinance'stext.
in
Thus, courtsmightconsiderwhethera police department,
to
an
administrative
has
a
rewaysanalogous
agency,
given law's
strictions
"more preciseshape" in advanceof "subject[ing]citizens
to penaltiesforunwantedbehavior.""227
They mighttake into account both provisionsforwarningsbeforearrestand regulations
likethe one in GeneralOrder92-4 limitingenforcement
authority
to speciallydesignatedofficers.
Even thingslike sunsetprovisions,
surprisingly,
mightcount in this fulleranalysis-as imposinga
timelimitationwithinwhicha givendegreeof police enforcement
will be toleratedand also at least potentially
authority
attestingto
a good faithefforton the partof the legislativebody to ensurea
periodicreassessmentwhetherpolice are implementinga public
orderlaw in a fairand equitableway.
B. A REALISTIC VAGUENESS JURISPRUDENCE REASSESSED

The constitutional
testoutlinedhere does not constitutea radical departureforthe vaguenessdoctrine,even if the adjudication
of facialvaguenesschallengespursuantto thistestmightrequire
recordin ways not
hearingsand the amassingof an evidentiary
226

Id at 16.

227

See generallyStrauss,89 Colum L Rev at 445 (cited in note 173).
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oftendeemed necessaryin the traditionalapproach.This is because the test does not rejectthe centralpremiseof the Court's
thatcourtsbear some constituvaguenessjurisprudence-namely,
forlimitingthe opportunity
forthe arbitrary
tionalresponsibility
applicationof legal prohibitions.Instead,the test seeks to transcend the limitationsof the doctrineas employedin Morales,and
in waysthatofferthe reasonableprospectthatcourtsmightactuof
ally-as opposed to symbolically-promotethe accountability
police.
The testhas two concreteadvantages.First,thistestavoidsthe
falsechoice evidentin theMoralesopinions.These opinionsseem
to profferonly two options for courts employingthe facial
approach:an approachto
vaguenessdoctrine.Firstis themajority's
facialvaguenessthatauthorizescourtsto second-guesscommunity
about the regulationof publicorderin whatis at best
preferences
an illusoryresponseto the problemsposed by unconstrained
pothisapproach
lice. Second is the dissenters'approach.Admittedly,
avoidseven the appearancethatcourtsare engagedin the ad hoc
reviewof publicorderlegislation.It avoidsthisappearance,however,onlyby so limitingthe facialvaguenessdoctrineas to essento the
tiallyrepudiateany role for this doctrinein contributing
reasonableconstraintof police. The presenttest,in contrast,focuses courtson a realisticassessmentof the waysin whichpublic
orderlawswillbe used. This focusguidesjudicialdecisionmaking
so thatopinionsin thisarea can be both persuasiveand effective
in the termsin whichtheyare written.
Second, the constitutionaltest outlinedhere stimulatesthose
actorsbest able to devise and then to experimentwithnew and
effectiveapproaches to the reasonable constraintof policeThe incentivesset by
namely,legislaturesand police departments.
actors
offon a chimerical
currentvaguenessdoctrinesend these
quest forevergreaterstandardsof clarityin the publicorderlaws
theypropose.A realisticapproachto vaguenessdoctrine,in conthatwill have real-worldconsetrast,enliststhemin experiments
in
which
the
for
police employpublicorderlaws on
ways
quences
But
the street.This approachthuspromotespolice accountability.
it does not imposeon generalistcourtstheimpossibletaskof fully
can be
definingthe conditionspursuantto which accountability
achieved.
One objectionto this analysismightbe that it proposeswhat
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amountsto a one-wayratchet.Thus, some publicorderlaws now
vulnerableto facialvaguenessreviewmightbe upheldpursuantto
this approach. Relativelyclear laws could not be challengedfor
forarbitrary
enforcevagueness,however,despitethe opportunity
ment they present.This "realistic" approach to the void-forvaguenessdoctrine,then,in effectexpandspolice power.This objection,however,ignoresboththe benefitsthatwould accruefrom
the realisticapproach and the detrimentsthat now flow from
sometimesdenyingpolice legitimateauthorityto deal withproblems theyare expectedto handle.
The benefitsof the realisticapproachcould be considerable.By
encouragingpolice departmentsto adopt measuresthat open up
discretionto monitoringand thatreasonably
police enforcement
constrainthe scope of police authority,courts may generate
changesnot only in the area of ordermaintenance,but in other
areas of police work as well. Police may come to recognizethat
theyhave much to gain fromthe favorablereviewof monitoring
authorities.They may begin to appreciatethe value of openness
as a wayin whichmore generallyto enlistcommunity
supportfor
enforcement
efforts.
Even if the realisticapproachto vaguenesshas no rippleeffects
on othercontextsin whichpolice exercisediscretion,
however,this
approach is still preferableto the Moralesmajority'sapproach.
Courts do no serviceto the projectof police reformwhen they
enunciateteststhatcreatean illusionof constraintthatdoes not
in factexist.Nor do theypromotepolice accountability
bydenying
police legitimateauthorityto addresscommunityproblems.The
realisticapproachoffersa betterway in whichto assess whether
the vaguenessin a public order law trulythreatensto promote
arbitrariness
on the street.Moreover,it bringscourtscloserto realizing the aspirationthat courtsthemselveshave articulatedfor
the facialvaguenessdoctrine.
The majorityin Moralesmade littleprogressin illuminating
pressingissues concerningthe relationshipbetween police and
communities.I should acknowledgein conclusion,however,that
the Court's failureto shed lighton theseissuesmaybe onlypartly
attributable
to the way in whichthe Moralesmajorityapproached
the subjectof police discretion.Indeed, the majority'ssuggestion
thatChicago's gang loiteringordinancemightbe valid if applied
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to gang membersalone raisesthe possibilitythatit was Chicago's
regulationof "innocentconduct,"ratherthanconcernsabout police discretion,thatreallydrovethe resultin thiscase.228
It is not
in
conclusion
this
to
address
the
substantive
dimenmy purpose
sions of vaguenessreview.But a briefobservationon the substanto Moralesis in order.
tiveundercurrents
The facialvaguenessdoctrineis sometimesemployedby courts
embracingProfessorSunstein's"judicialminimalism"to avoiddifissues-as whena potentially
ficultsubstantive
suspectlaw is invalidated forvagueness,leavingopen the questionwhetherthislaw
on other,substantivegrounds.Admittedly,
was unconstitutional
there are oftengood reasons for the judicial reticencethat this
use of vaguenesspermits.Such reticence,however,is
substantive
not alwaysto be applauded.And perhapsit should not be applauded here.
If the problemwhetherChicago's gang loiteringordinanceinrightsis complex,so too is the problemfaced
fringedfundamental
communities
seekingbothto restraintheirpolice and to confer
by
on themthosereasonablepowersthatmightbe of help in dealing
withpressingproblemsof crime and disorder.Granted,realism
about police patrolcannotilluminatethe questionwhetheractivities like publicloiteringare protectedby the Due Process Clause.
Such realism,however,can help communitiesto betterregulate
theirpolice. This articlehas suggestedthatthepolice need to deal
theirexerciseof
withcommunitiesin acknowledging
forthrightly
If thisis truefor
discretionand in seekingtermsof accountability.
police,however,it mayalso be trueforthe Court. To the extent
that substantiveconsiderationsare importantto the outcome of
cases like Morales,the Court may help communitiesby at least
focusingthemon theissuestrulyat stakein theregulationofpublic order.Perhapsit is time fortheJustices,like police, to speak
clearly.
228See Morales,
119 S

Ct at 1862.

